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Chapter 7 Cases:
Do ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code
Conflict as to Whether a Debtor's
Interest in or Rights Under a Qualified
Plan Can be Used to Pay Claims?*
by
Donna Litman Seiden**

SECOND INSTALLMENT**

*

II. CURRENT LAW FOR CHAPTER 7 DEBTORS
B. THE ExEMPTION IssuE: IFA DEBTOR'S INTEREST IN AN ERISA QUALIFIED
PLAN IS "PROPERTY" OF SUCH DEBTOR'S ESTATE, IS IT EXEMPT?

If the debtor's interest in an ERISA plan is considered property of the
debtor's bankruptcy estate, then the debtor still may be able to prevent creditors from reaching it by claiming all or a portion of it as exempt property.
The exemption may arise by reason of a claim to a federal bankruptcy exemption, a federal nonbankruptcy exemption, or a state exemption. 5 4 The
Bankruptcy Code provides a debtor with certain exemptions under section
522(d), including an exemption of the right to receive certain payments from
retirement plans. However, the applicable state with jurisdiction may preclude
a debtor from claiming any exemptions under Bankruptcy Code section
*01987. All rights reserved.
**Associate Professor of Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law; A.B. cum laude, 1973,
University of Miami; J.D. with Honors, 1976, University of Florida, College of Law. Professor Seiden
teaches Tax Consequences of Pensions, Profit-Sharing Plans and Other Employee Benefits and is a Florida Bar Certified Tax Attorney. She also serves as Chair of the Federal Estate and Gift Taxation Committee of the Tax Section of The Florida Bar and Chair of the Tax Aspects of Estates and Trusts Committee
of the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of The Florida Bar.
***The First Installment appears at 61 AM. B~AKR. LJ.219 (1987).
15411
U.S.C. § 522 (b) (1979), modified, BAFJA, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 306(a) (1984).
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522(d) 55 by "opting-out" of the federal bankruptcy exemptions. 5 6 A significant number of states have opted-out: 57 so that the debtor is allowed to claim
only exemptions that are available under federal nonbankruptcy law or under state law.' 8 If the state has not opted-out, then the debtor can choose
(i) the federal bankruptcy exemptions (under Bankruptcy Code section 522(d))
or (ii) any available federal nonbankruptcy exemptions and any available state
1'511
U.S.C. § 522(d) (1979), modified, BAFJA, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 306(b)-(c) (1984).
5'Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159, 162 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 983 (1983), upholding
the validity of TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-112 (1980), which provides that "the citizens of Tennes,
see.., pursuant to section 522 (b)(1),
Public Law 95-598 known as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Title 11 U.S.C. section 522(b)(1), are not authorized to claim as exempt the property described in the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. 522(d):'
For a further discussion regarding the uniformity requirement of bankruptcy laws under U.S. Const.
art. 1, § 8, cl.
4, see, e.g., In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 992 (1982);
In re Parrish, 19 Bankr. 331 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982); Kosto v. Lausch (In re Lausch), 16 Bankr. 162 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1981); Curry v. Associates Fin. Servs. (In re Curry), 5 Bankr. 282 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980);
Centran Bank v. Ambrose (In re Ambrose), 4 Bankr. 395 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980). See also Fox, Section
522(b)(1): An Examination and Evaluation of the Opt-Out Proviso, 2 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 395, 420-27 (1983)
(discussion regarding whether Congress delegated its authority to regulate bankruptcy with respect to
exemptions), and Mordy, Dunn & Johnson, Constitutionality of 'OptOut" Statutes Providing for Exemptions to Bankrupts, 48 Mo. L. Rav. 627 (1983).
i57See, e.g., the following state statutes precluding a debtor's election of the federal bankruptcy ex,
emptions under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d); ALA. CODE § 6-10-11 (Supp. 1983); ALAsKA STAT. § 09.38.055 (1982);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1133(B) (Supp. 1983-1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 36-210 (Supp. 1983); CAL.
[CIv. PROC.) CODE § 703.130 (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-54-107 (Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 4914(a) (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. § 222.20 (1983); GA.CODE ANN. § 51-1601(a) (Supp.
1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1201 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-2-28-0.5 (Bums
Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.10 (West Supp. 1984); Ky. REv. STAT. ANNi. § 427.170 (Michie/BobbsMerrill Supp. 1982); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13: 3881 B(1) (West Supp. 1984); ME. Rv.STAT. ANNs.
tit. 14, § 4426 (Supp. 1983-1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.427 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 31-2-106 (1983); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-15, 105 (Supp. 1982) and 21.090(3) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 21.090(3) (1983); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 511:2-a (1983); N.Y. [DEPT. & CRED.] LAW § 284 (Consol.
Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1C-1601(f) (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-17 (Supp. 1983); OKu.A.
STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1.B (West Supp. 1983-1984); OR. REv. STAT. § 23.305 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-41-425 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-45-13 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-23-15 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 34-3.1 (Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-10-4 (Supp.
1984); Wyo. STAT. § 1-20-109 (Supp. 1984). See also CAL. [CIv. PROC.) CODE § 703.130 (West Supp.
1984) (state opted-out of exemptions for all debtors except (i) a husband and wife filing petitions m bankrupt,
cy individually but not jointly if they both effectively waive their state exemptions or (ii) a husband and
wife filing a joint petition, in which case they may choose between the federal bankruptcy exemptions
or the state exemptions), and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.371 (West Supp. 1984) (opting out of the federal
bankruptcy exemptions except for a husband and wife filing joint petition who may jointly elect the federal bankruptcy exemptions or the Minnesota exemptions and with a further exception and limitation for
an individual petition by one spouse or for individual petitions by both spouses.) See also OHIO Rev. CODE
ANN. § 2329.66.2 (Anderson Supp. 1983 and Supp. 1984) (optout effective through 1984 and repealed
effective Jan. 1, 1985). See also IDAHo CODE § 11-602 (1979) which provides: "Residents of this state
are entitled to the exemptions provided by this act. Nonresidents are entitled to the exemptions provided
by the law of the jurisdiction of their residence"
1SsAnd the debtor may exempt an interest as a tenant by the entirety or a joint tenant if the interest
is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law, 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A), discussed supra
note 86.
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exemptions. 5 9
1. FederalBankruptcy Exemption (Bankruptcy Code Section 522(d)(10) (E))
a. Summary of Law
If a state has not opted-out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions, then
a debtor who is subject to the laws of such state may elect any of the federal
bankruptcy exemptions under Bankruptcy Code section 522(d). 60 The applicable state is the "place in which the debtor's domicile has been located
for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of filing of the [bankruptcy]
petition, or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other
place.' 161 One of these federal bankruptcy exemptions pertains to the debtor's right to receive a payment from certain plans under certain circumstances.
There are three requirements to satisfy the exemption. The first requirement
is that the right to receive a payment must be from "a stock bonus, pension,
profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disa162
bility, death, age, or length of service"
15911 U.S.C. § 522 (1979), modified, BAFJA, Pub. L. No. 98-353, §§ 306, 453 (1984), specifies the
exemptions to which a debtor may be entitled, including the debtor's option of selecting exemptions available under state and federal nonbankruptcy laws.
If the debtor's liabilities include consumer debts which are secured by property of the estate, then
the debtor has 30 days after the earlier of the filing of the bankruptcy petition or the meeting ofcreditors
to elect if the debtor intends to claim such secured property as exempt. The court can extend said 30
day period for cause. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2) (1979), modified, BAFJA, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 305 (1984).
Otherwise, the Bankruptcy Code does not specify the time for filing an exemption or, if the state has
not opted-out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions, for electing any state and federal nonbankruptcy
law exemptions over the federal bankruptcy exemptions.
11 U.S.C. § 522(e) (1979), modified, BAFJA, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 453(c) (1984), does, however,
list who may file an exemption: the debtor or a dependent of the debtor on behalf of the debtor. Thus,
it would appear that a trustee of an ERISA plan could not claim an exemption in his capacity as the
trustee. See Joelson v. Tiffin Savings Bank (In re Everhart), 11 Bankr. 770 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (bank
as secured creditor had no standing to raise exempt status of plan; however, plan interest was held exempt, but it was unclear who claimed the exemption). With respect to whether a debtor who has elected
a federal bankruptcy exemption may change his or her election to a state or other federal exemption,
or vice versa, see e.g., In re Miller, No. 3-83-500 (D. Minn. Apr. 24, 1984) (LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases
file) (citing FED. R. BANrs.P. 1009); In re Sheridan, 38 Bankr. 52, 54 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983); In re Strasma,
26 Bankr. 449 (Bankr. Wise. 1983). For cases filed after October 7, 1984, BAFJA amended 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(b) (1979) to provide that in a joint case, a husband and wife must both choose either the federal
bankruptcy exemptions or the exemptions under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2), i.e., state or other federal law
exemptions. BAFJA, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 306(a) (1984).
16011 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1979), modified, BAFJA, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 306(b)-(c) (1984).
16111 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A).
16211
U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). Several cases have construed this requirement to apply only when the
benefits are "akin to future earnings" See Nelson v. White (In re White), 61 Bankr. 388, 395 (W.D. Wash.
1986) (debtor could withdraw funds at any time by terminating employment, thus, benefits did not qualify for exemption); In re Pettit, 61 Bankr. 341, 347-48 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1986) (debtor could withdraw
funds at any time subject to penalty, thus benefits did not qualify for exemption). See also In re Pauquette,
38 Bankr. 170, 173-74 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984) (debtor's interest in individual retirement annuity was not
exempt because debtor could "divert the account proceeds from retirement purposes,' and the benefits
were not "'benefits akin to future earnings of the debtor" within the meaning of the legislative history).
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The second requirement is that at least one of the following three conditions must be satisfied:
(1) the plan or contract must not have been "established by or under the
auspices of an insider that employed the debtor at the time the debtor's rights
under such plan or contract arose"'163 (an "Insider Plan"), or
(2) the payment must not be "on account of age or length of service '16 4 or
(3) the plan or contract must be one that complies with any of the following sections of the Internal Revenue Code sections: 165 (a) 401(a) - generally
a corporate or Keogh plan, 66 (b) 403(a) - a qualified annuity plan, (c) 403(b)
- an annuity purchased by an organization exempt under Internal Revenue
Code section 501(c)(3) or a public school, (d) 408 - an individual retirement
account or annuity, or (e) 409 - a retirement bond under the Second Liberty
Bond Act (a "Qualified Plan").
If the first requirement is met and if any one or more of the above three
conditions of the second requirement is met and the interest is property of
the estate, then the third requirement of the exemption is that the payment
must be "reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor"'167 Thus, only to the extent the payment is reasonably
necessary for support can it be exempt.
Accordingly, if the state did not opt-out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions, if the debtor elects his or her Bankruptcy Code section 522(d) exemptions, and if the debtor has the right to receive a payment from a Qualified
Plan on account of illness, disability, death, age or length of service, which
is included as property of the debtor's estate,168 then the debtor can exempt
16311 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E)(i).
16411 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E)(ii). The winner of a state lottery, paid by an annuity purchased by the

estate, was not receiving an annuity "on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service"
under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). In re Miller, 16 Bankr. 790, 791-92 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982).
16511 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E)(ii).
166If the plan is a Qualified Plan under Internal Revenue Code section 401(a), then the exemption
is only relevant in a jurisdiction that treats such interest in the plan as property of the estate, notwithstanding the plan provision prohibiting assignment or alienation as required by the Internal Revenue Code.
If a court finds that a debtor's interest in a Qualified Plan is not property of the bankruptcy estate because it is subject to an enforceable restriction against transfer, then the exemption under 11 U.S.C. §
522(d)(10)(E) applies only to plan benefits that are not subject to the ERISA required plan prohibition
against alienation and that are either not payable from an Insider Plan or that are not payable on account
of age or service. See also infra Section III.C of this article, entitled, "Do ERISA and the Bankruptcy
Code (and Applicable Nonbankruptcy State Law) Conflict in a Chapter 7 Case and If So, Which Prevails?:' for a further discussion of the property definition and this exemption.
.6711 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1O)(E).
16SBut see discussion infra text accompanying notes 232-33 with respect to the argument that the
exemption in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) does not apply to ERISA qualified plans, since they are excluded
from being property of the estate, but instead applies only to certain plans that are not subject to the
ERISA required plan prohibition against alienation.
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the right to the extent it is reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor. The legislative history provides that
this provision "exempts certain benefits that are akin to future earnings of
the debtor."169 Therefore, it appears that one of the purposes of this exemption was to provide an exemption for a right to a plan benefit that under the
old Bankruptcy Act would have been excluded from being property of the
estate because it represented a right to future earnings. 70 However, this new
exemption is more limited than the prior law's total exclusion, because the
exemption applies only to the extent the right is reasonably necessary for
support.
The Bankruptcy Code does not specify any standards for determining
what is reasonably necessary for support and does not specify over what period
of time the reasonable support is to be provided or whether other available
assets are to be considered. Further, the legislative history does not specify
a standard per se; however, it does state that the federal bankruptcy exemptions are "derived in large part from the Uniform Exemptions Act, promul171
gated by the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws in August, 1976."'
Section 6(b) of the Uniform Exemptions Act states that:
ItIhe phrase 'property to the extent reasonably necessary for
the support of him [an individual] and his dependents' means
property required to meet the present and anticipated needs
of the individual and his dependents, as determined by the
court after consideration of the individual's responsibilities
and all the present and anticipated property and income of
72
the individual, including that which is exempt.
A review of the reported cases involving this exemption provides some
insight into the various standards that have been employed. The Fifth Circuit, in dictum in a footnote, summarized some of these cases in stating that
"[tlhe factors considered by the courts in determining what amounts are
'reasonably necessary for.., support' include, for example, age, health, future earnings, capacity, necessary expenditures "' 73 In applying the federal
bankruptcy exemption, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut
74
used a standard similar to the one defined in the Uniform Exemption Act.
169

H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., ist Sess. 362, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5963,7 6318.
1 0See supra text accompanying notes 60-72.
171H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3613, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
5963, 6317.
172UNfoms EXEMPTIONS ACT § 6(b), 13 U.L.A. 365, 382 (1979).
'17Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 580 n.15 (5th Cir. 1983). The statement is dictum because debtor was found to have waived the federal bankruptcy exemptions and had not appealed that
finding. Id. at 577, n.5.
' 74XVarren v. Taff (In re Taft), 10 Bankr. 101 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
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It stated that:
the reasonably necessary standard requires that the court
take into account other income and exempt property of the
debtor, present and anticipated,... and that the appropriate amount to be set aside for the debtor ought to be sufficient to sustain basic needs, not related to his former status
in society or the lifestyle to which he is accustomed but taking into account the special needs that a retired and elderly
debtor may claim.'"7
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota and for the Northern
District of Texas agreed with the standard used by the Connecticut court
in looking to current and future retirement needs as well as other sources
of income and in considering the exemption. 7 6 The Bankruptcy Court for
the District of New Mexico phrased the standard somewhat differently when
it stated that "[iln determining what is reasonably necessary for the support
of the debtor, the Court must look at the present circumstances of the debtor, other exempt property, and the debtor's present income, plus any other
factors which would indicate what amount is truly necessary to meet the
debtor's basic needs "'177 Thus, the meaning of reasonably necessary for support is determined on a case-by-case basis. 7 8
b. Summary of Exemption Cases under Bankruptcy Code Section
522(d)(10)(E)
In a Minnesota case, a currently employed debtor was allowed to exempt
7

1 1Id. at 107.
176In re Miller, 33 Bankr. 549, 553 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983). Minnesota opted-out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions effective March 19, 1982, but this case was filed prior to that effective date. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 550.371 (West Supp. 1984). The case, however, will be relevant to Minnesota debtors because
there is a state exemption for rights to receive payments from certain plans "to the extent reasonably
necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor." Id. § 550.37, Subd. 24.
See also In re Sheridan, 38 Bankr. 52 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983), holding that the debtor's interest in the
Vermont Employees' Retirement System was not property of the estate; where the court also stated that
"fa]ssuming, arguendo, that the interest was part of the debtor's estate, it nevertheless is exempt in full
under Code section 522(d)(10)(E)" Id. at 56. In considering the exemption, the opinion stated that "the
court must look to the support requirements of the debtor both now and in futuro when the debtor's
employment ends." Id. at 57. Further, the court held the $18,230 interest was a modest retirement income which in addition to the 46-year old debtor's present weekly salary of $507 and future social security benefits" was reasonably necessary for the long-term support of the debtor and his dependents... .
Id. In re Grant, 40 Bankr. 612, 614 (Bankr. WD. Tex. 1984).
7
1 7In re Johnson, 36 Bankr. 54, 55-56 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1984).
i7sSee Warren v. Taff (In re Taf), 10 Bankr. 101, 106 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981), where the bankruptcy
judge stated: "I assume that Congress omitted from the Bankruptcy Code the statutory definition of the
reasonably necessary limitation contained in the UEA [Uniform Exemptions Act] because it expected
the courts to evolve standards on a case-by-case basis'
The reasonably necessary standard is also contained in other federal exemptions. See, e.g., In re Miller,
36 Bankr. 420 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1984), regarding 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(E) (1979). See also 11 U.S.C.

§ 522(d)(10)(D), (11)(B).

1987)

ERISA V. BANKRUPTCY CODE

a pension payable in the future but not a profit-sharing plan account balance.P 9
The court held that a $353 monthly pension that would begin if the debtor
terminated his employment one year later at age 55 was reasonably necessary for his support. The debtor was earning $27,800 per year and had no
current right to receive the monthly pension, which had an estimated lump
sum value of $38,000. By contrast, the debtor had the right to withdraw
all of his profit-sharing plan account balance of $3,120 to relieve certain hardships or for certain reasons and also had the current right to withdraw $888
of that account balance. 80 The court held that the debtor's profit-sharing plan
account balance was not reasonably necessary for the debtor's support and
thus was not exempt.
In a New York case, a 62-year old, unemployed husband was able to exempt a $21,993 lump sum payment from a qualified pension plan, even though
he had received the payment three weeks before filing a joint bankruptcy petition with his wife.'8 ' In order to reach the exemption issue, the court held
that the payment retained its character as a pension benefit - a very liberal
holding supported by unusually persuasive facts. The debtor had emphysema and was receiving social security disability payments and his 64-year old
wife had cancer-related medical problems. Their only source of income, other
than the social security payments, was the lump sum distribution. With respect
to the exemption issue, the court held that the payment was reasonably necessary for the present and future support of the debtor-husband and his wife.
In a New Mexico case, $12,278 of the value of stock held in a qualified
stock bonus plan were reasonably necessary for the debtor's support and exempt.18 2 In that case the debtor was 47 years old, unemployed, and divorced,
and his necessary expenses for support included his obligation to pay alimony, his living expenses for utilities, telephone, and basic subsistence, and also
his costs to continue to search for employment. The plan was a thrift plan;
and if the stock was purchased in part by the debtor's contributions and in
part by his employer's matching contributions, then not only can a debtor's
right to receive plan payments funded by employer contributions and earnings thereon be exempt, but also a debtor's right to receive plan payments
17

1n re Miller, 33 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983). See also supra note 176 and accompanying text.
' 50The court held that the bankruptcy trustee could exercise the debtor's right to withdraw a portion
of the nonexempt profit-sharing plan funds and the debtor's right to request funds for hardship. In re
Miller, 33 Bankr. 549, 551 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983).
's'In re Donaghy, 11 Bankr. 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981). New York opted-out of the federal bankrupt,
cy exemptions with respect to bankruptcy petitions filed on or after September 1, 1982, but the case
was filed and decided prior to that effective date. N.Y. [DEBT. & Citan. l LAW § 284 (Consol. Supp. 1983).
The case, however, will be relevant to New York debtors because New York also adopted a state exemp
tion using language very similar to the federal bankruptcy exemption considered by the case. N.Y. [DEBT.
& CRED.] LAW § 282 (Consol. Supp. 1983).
1821n re Johnson, 36 Bankr. 54 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1984).
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arising from employee contributions and earnings thereon can be exempt.
In a Connecticut case, 50 percent of a retired debtor's right to an annual
pension of $29,227 was held to be reasonably necessary for support. 8 3 The
court considered that the debtor's available annual income was his pension,
plus approximately $6,700 a year in social security benefits and $1,200 a year
from interest. The other 50 percent of the plan benefits were not exempt
and were available to satisfy claims of his ex-wife, his one significant creditor.
In a Wisconsin case, affirmed by the Seventh Circuit, approximately
$127,000 of a debtor's account balances in two contributory retirement plans
were not reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor. 8 4 The 44-year
old debtor-doctor was not currently receiving plan benefits, his projected income exceeded his current living expenses by $1,500 a month, and the court
expressed the opinion that he could reestablish the plan with his future excess funds. Thus, the court held that neither of the plan rights was exempt
from creditors.
In a Third Circuit case involving a New Jersey debtor, the court held
that a debtor could not exempt his Keogh plan rights because the exemption
only applied when the debtor had a right to receive benefits. Since the court
held he had "no present right to receive payments" 85 and the future rights
to payments could not be exempt under any circumstances, the court did not
discuss whether the rights were reasonably necessary for support. From this
decision, it is unclear how the court would rule if a debtor had the right to
receive installment payments, one of which was payable currently when the
debtor filed bankruptcy and the remaining installments were payable at intervals in the future: would this court allow the debtor to exempt only the debtor's right to the one current payment or could the debtor also exempt the
future installments to the extent reasonably necessary for support? The court
should hold that if the debtor is in current pay status and the interest is property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate, then the debtor can exempt future
payments if reasonably necessary for support. The concurring opinion concluded that since the plan specifically provided that it terminated if the debtor's employer were declared insolvent by a judicial proceeding, and the employer
was the debtor in bankruptcy, that there was no plan and thus there were
no plan rights to exempt.j8 6 Both the majority and the concurring opinion
for the Third Circuit are very literal in their construction of the exemption
1s3Warren v. Taff (In re Taft), 10 Bankr. 101 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (if the debtor had elected the
state exemption rather than the federal, a maximum of 25 percent of this annual pension would have
been exempt).
184In re Kochell, 732 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'g 26 Bankr. 86 (Bankr. D. Wisc. 1982). It is unclear
what type of plan was involved, but the court stated that the debtor-doctor had contributed to a pension
plan offered by the clinic that employed him. Further it appears one of the plans had been rolled over
into an individual retirement account.
issIn re Clark, 711 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1983).
'561d. at 24-25. But see supra note 43.
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and not representative of the other opinions on point. The other opinions
on point generally rely on substance rather than form, on the fresh-start purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, and on the need to balance the debtor's and
the creditors' needs.
In a Texas case, a debtor's interest of $13,915 in a retirement plan and
a profit-sharing plan established by his former employer was exempt in part
under a wildcard exemption, with the balance being exempt under Bankruptcy
Code section 522(d)(10)(E): 8 7 The debtor's wife had joined in the petition,
thereafter had lost her job with a bank, and then was working part-time as
a waitress and also attending college. The court stated that "[wihere, as here,
the family substantially is a one income family with the contributions made
or expected to be made by [the debtor's wife] while she is attending school
being insignificant, the liberality which is applied to exemption claims mandates that [the] inquiry [as to whether the husband's rights under the plans
are exempt] be answered in the affirmative"'188 Thus, the court held that approximately $6,015 were reasonably necessary for support.
In dictum in a Tennessee case, the bankruptcy court also stated that it
was not necessary to determine if Keogh plan benefits were necessary for
the support of the debtor under Bankruptcy Code section 522(d)(10) when
the debtor was 37 years old, actively employed in his medical practice, and
W 8 9 The decision is dictum since Tennot currently receiving plan payments.
nessee has opted-out of the federal bankruptcy exemption by statute.190
A related issue, when a debtor claims the federal bankruptcy exemption
for a right to a plan benefit is whether the plan was established by an insider. 9 ' An insider is defined under Bankruptcy Code section 101(28), and
the definition includes a corporation of which an individual debtor is a director, officer, or person in control; a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; a relative, related within the third degree; and an affiliate of the
debtor. 92 An affiliate includes a corporation if 20 percent or more of its out187In re

Grant, 40 Bankr. 612 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1984) ($7,900 was exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5)).

'88d. at 614.
19

9 1n re Clark, 18 Bankr. 824 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
190Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 E2d 159 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983).
19111 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E)(i). See also In re Grant, 40 Bankr. 612, 613 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984),
where the debtor-husband had an interest in a retirement plan and profit-sharing plan at Panhandle Steel
and the court stated "[i]n the instant case there was no proof offered which would tend to show that
the employer was an insider to the debtor at the time the plans were adopted so it is not necessary to
inquire concerning the remaining exceptions" of U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E).
192An insider is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(28), BAFJA, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 4210)(2) (1984) (formerly 11 U.S.C. § 101(25) (1979)). The definition states that an insider "includes, thus, by implication
the definition is not exclusive and an insider could also be a person or entity not specifically listed in
11 U.S.C. § 101(28).
Compare In re Sheridan, 38 Bankr. 52, 57 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983) (holding that the State of Vermont
is not an insider, assuming, arguendo,the debtor's interest in the Vermont Employees' Retirement System
was property of the estate), with In re Werner, 31 Bankr. 418 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983) (holding that the
debtor was employed by the State of Minnesota "which qualifies the State as the insider employer who
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standing voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held
by the debtor. It also appears that the Bankruptcy Code can be interpreted
so that the -debtor is not an insider. Under this interpretation if the debtor
is self-employed and the debtor creates a Keogh plan, the plan would not
be an Insider Plan, and if the debtor-sole proprietor filed a petition in bankruptcy, the debtor's interest in the Keogh plan could be claimed as exempt to
the extent reasonably necessary for support.193 By contrast, a plan created
by a professional or regular corporation of which the debtor is an officer or
director would be an Insider Plan; however, if the plan were a Qualified Plan,
the fact that it also was an Insider Plan would not prevent the debtor's rights
to payment from the plan from being exempt to the extent reasonably necessary for support.
Thus, assuming the debtor has an interest in a Qualified Plan that is
property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate and the applicable state has not
opted-out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions, then the debtor may elect
to exempt the interest. In the Third Circuit, the court then may make a determination as to whether the debtor has a present right to receive payments
from the plan so as to be eligible for the exemption. Once the debtor is eligible to and makes the election, then the court should make a factual determination as to whether all or any portion of the interest is reasonably necessary
for support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor. Alternatively,
the debtor could elect to use any available state exemptions and any available federal nonbankruptcy exemptions to exempt the debtor's plan interests.
2. State Exemption (Bankruptcy Code Section 522(b)(2)(A))
If a debtor has an interest in an ERISA qualified plan that is property
of the debtor's bankruptcy estate, then the debtor may have the right to exempt all or a portion of the debtor's interest by reason of an available state
exemption. If available under state statutory or case law, the exemption may
be claimed by a debtor regardless of whether the state has opted-out of the
federal bankruptcy exemptions.1 94 However, if the applicable state has not
opted-out, the debtor must choose either the federal bankruptcy exemptions
or the available state and federal nonbankruptcy exemptions. 95 Further, in
established" the plan.) See also infra note 193.
A relative is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(37), BAFJA, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 4210)(2) (1984) (formerly 11 U.S.C. § 101(34) (1979)). 11 U.S.C. § 101(2) defines an affiliate and Id. § 101(2)(B) defines a corporate affiliate.
193See In re Pauquette, 38 Bankr. 170 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984) (individual retirement annuity established
by debtor was not established by an insider that employed the debtor at the time his contract ights
arose). See also N.Y. [DEBT. & CRED.] LAW § 282(2)(e)(i) (McKinney 1983), which specifically refers to
a plan or contract "established by the debtor or under the auspices of an insider that employed the debtor
at the time the debtor's rights under such plan or contract arose... " (emphasis added) to eliminate this
interpretational problem.
19411 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1979), modified, BAFJA, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 306(a) (1984).
195Id.
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order to choose a state exemption, the debtor must comply with the Bankruptcy Code and rules and with state law in order to claim the exemption properly
96
and timely.
Certain state statutes completely parallel the federal bankruptcy exemption in Bankruptcy Code section 522(d)(10)(E). 97 Other state statutes are
modeled after the federal bankruptcy exemption in part but depart from the
language in the Bankruptcy Code in various ways, including with respect
98
to the type of plan interest or the respective amount that can be exempt.
9

Zimmerman v. Morgan (Inre Morgan), 689 F.2d 471, 472 (4th Cir. 1982) (the court stated
that "tflor property to be exempt under state or local law, it must be claimed as exempt in the manner
prescribed by those laws" and "Morgan's failure to comply with the Virginia homestead exemption statute precludes him from claiming that exemption for bankruptcy purposes"). See also White v. Stamp, 266
U.S. 310 (1924).
197
E.g., ME. REv.STAT. ANN-.tit. 14, § 4422(13)(E) (Supp. 1983-1984) (exemption from attachment
and execution); Mo. ANN.STAT. § 513.430(e) (Vernon Supp. 1984) uses the same language as is used
in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E), to provide an exemption from attachment and execution, except that the
Missouri statute refers to persons rather than debtors; W. VA. CODE ANN.§ 38-10-40)(5) (Supp. 1984)
(exemption).
19
8E.g., N.Y. [Dar. & CRED.] LAw § 282(2)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1983) (exemption deviates with respect
to the references to insider plans, does not refer to a right to receive a payment from an annuity plan,
and includes the right to receive a payment from an eligible state deferred compensation plan under I.R.C.
1 6In

§ 457).
Orno REv.CODE ANN. § 2329.66(A)(10)(b) (Anderson 1981) (excludes payments and differs slightly
with respect to the exception to the exemption for non-qualified or disqualified insider plans).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 12-1001(g)(5) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984) (exempts rights to the extent necessary for support without any reference to "reasonably" necessary).
TENN. CODE ANN.§ 26-2-111 (1980) (exemption statute exempts the same types of plans as the federal bankruptcy exemption but does not refer to payments on account of illness or disability, limits the
exemption to the extent earnings would be exempt from garnishment, and does not exempt an interest
if the debtor can receive the interest in a lump sum, in periodic payments of less than 60 months or before
age 58); TENN.CODE ANN. § 26-2-106 (1980) (regarnishment of earnings). See also In re Elsea, 47 Bankr.
142 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) (interests in defined contribution plans not exempt); In re Clark, 18 Bankr.
824 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (debtor's interest in Keogh plan not exempt).
S. C. CODE ANN. §*15-41-200(10)(E) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983) (exempts all of the debtor's rights
from attachment, levy, and sale under mesne or final process issued by any court or bankruptcy proceeding if the debtor is domiciled in South Carolina).
The following states delete any exception for nonqualified insider plans: GA. CooE ANN.§ 51-1301.1
(Supp. 1982) (exemption statute does not refer specifically to a stock bonus or profit-sharing plan), (construed by Inre Craddock, 62 Bankr. 583 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986), to only exempt payments not plan interests); IDAHO CODE § 11-604 (1984) (exemption statute is more liberal than the federal bankruptcy
exemption in that it refers to "assets held, payments made, and amounts payable" under certain plans,
but it does not exempt a death benefit, and it defines the phrase "property to the extent reasonably necessary
for the support of him and his dependents"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.6(9)(e) (West Supp. 1984) (exemption does not refer to stock bonus or profit-sharing plans); Ky. Rsv. STAT. § 427.150(1)(b) (Supp. 1982)
(provides the same exemption as the Idaho exemption statute cited supra except there is no statutory
definition of property reasonably necessary for support); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37 subd. 24 (West
Supp. 1984) (not only exempts the debtor's right to receive payments but also exempts payments received
by the debtor); see also In re Bari, 43 Bankr. 253 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (portion of debtor's monthly
disability payments was exempt); and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-6 (Supp. 1983) (exemption for benefits
other than by reason of illness or disability).
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Whether the applicable state will follow the analogous cases interpreting any
comparable portion of the federal bankruptcy exemption for plan interests
depends upon the particular state; although, a debtor may want to cite some
of these cases as persuasive authority. 99 Further, other states have individual exemption statutes that use language substantially different from the federal bankruptcy exemption statute, 200 with certain states exempting all
pensions, 201 or all pensions from a certain source, or all pensions payable to
202
certain debtors, such as government employees.
In addition, a debtor's plan interest may be subject to a spendthrift trust
provision authorized by a state statute or by case law, or the spendthrift requirement may be imposed upon the trust interest by a statute. The spendthrift provision may qualify as a valid state exemption. 20 3 In addition, a debtor
may be able to argue that plan benefits are exempt under state law as wages
' 99See cases cited and discussed supra text and accompanying notes 173-90. E.g., In rePhillips, 45
Bankr. 529 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (the court referred to cases construing the reasonably necessary
standard under the federal bankruptcy exemption to determine if the debtor's severance pay was reasonably necessary for support of the debtor and any of his dependents under OHIO REV. COD ANN. §
2329.66(A)(10)(b) (Anderson 1981)); In reSchlee, 60 Bankr. 524 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986); In reBartlett,
67 Bankr. 455, 456 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986), in which "the Court looks to similar state and Bankruptcy
Code exemption statutes for guidance in interpreting Missouri's statute"; McClean v. McClean (In re
Kerr), 65 Bankr. 739, 747 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986). See also In reFlygstad, 56 Bankr. 884, 889-90 (Bankr.
N.D. Iowa 1986), for other factors regarding what is reasonably necessary for support under the Iowa
statutory exemption.
200
CAL. [CIv. PROC.] COD § 704.115 (West Supp. 1984) (exempts "[all amounts held, controlled or
in process of distribution by a private retirement plan' with a limitation for exemption from judgments
for spousal or child support and different limitations on periodic versus nonperiodic payments) and CAL.
[CIv. PRoc.] CoD §§ 706.052, 703.070(c) (Deering 1983) and 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. 1979). Daniel
v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank (In reDaniel), 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985) (available Oct. 1, 1985 on
LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file) (profit-sharing plan was not a retirement plan, so plan benefits were
not exempt).
Cos. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 52-352b(m) (West Supp. 1984) exempts payments from certain plans qualified
under certain Internal Revenue Code sections and established for the primary purposes of providing retirement benefits by age, health, or service and limited to the extent wages are exempt. 1983 CONN. AcTs
83-581, § 13 (f) (Jan. Sess.).
201OR. REv.STAT. § 23.170 (1983) (exempts all pensions for service with the United States government, a state subdivision or municipality, or any person, partnership,association, or corporationfrom all
execution and all other process except for a judgment for support obligation).
2
02E.g., LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 17:1613 (West 1982) (Louisiana State University Retirement System);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 19-5-704 (1983) (Judges' Retirement); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, 13 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1984) (exempting United States or Illinois pensions on account of military or naval service); OrLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 7 (West Supp. 1984) (exempts pensions received by disabled resident from service
as United States soldier, sailor or marine); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-10-2 (Supp. 1983) (exempts pensions
of "person supporting only themselves"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.2308 (1983) (exempts payments to United States pensioner received within three months of execution or attachment and reasonably necessary
for support).
2°oSee, e.g., In re Nichols, 1 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 765 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980), discussed supra
text accompanying note 143. For another Florida decision on the property definition issue, see supra text
and accompanying note 142.
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05
or future wages 20 4 or as an annuity.2
Thus, a debtor who has lost, conceded to, or not raised the issue as to
whether the debtor's plan interest is property of the estate can allege that
the interest is exempt if there is an applicable state exemption statute or if
the interest is subject to a spendthrift provision that is valid under applicable state law. In many cases, the debtor may advance the argument that the
plan interest is not property of the estate and that, in the alternative, it is
exempt if it is property of the estate.

3. FederalNonbankruptcy Exemption (Bankruptcy Code Section 522(b)(2)(A))
A debtor may elect to exempt any property included in the estate "that
is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this section [522
of the Bankruptcy Code. "' 20 6 This is sometimes referred to as a "federal nonbankruptcy exemption." The debtor may claim a federal nonbankruptcy ex207
emption if the state has opted-out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions.
The debtor also may claim a federal nonbankruptcy exemption if the state
has not opted-out of the federal bankruptcy elections, provided the debtor
does not elect to take advantage of any federal bankruptcy elections. 208
One issue that arises in this context is whether ERISA creates a federal
nonbankruptcy exemption for a doctor's interest in an ERISA qualified plan.
The language in the Bankruptcy Code regarding federal nonbankruptcy exemptions is broad enough to include ERISA. The legislative history gives
a noninclusive list of some of the other federal laws that could provide exemptions. 20 9 Pension benefits from ERISA plans are not listed; whereas, social security payments, Railroad Retirement Act annuities and pensions, and
special pensions paid to winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor are
204

1n re Harter, 10 Bankr. 272 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1981) (retired debtor's future monthly Army retire-

ment pay, contingent on debtor being alive on the first day of the month, was not property ofthe debtor's
bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541); In re Haynes, 9 Bankr. 418 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1981), aff'd,
679 F.2d 718 (7th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 970 (1982) (retired debtor's future monthly Navy
retirement pay, contingent upon debtor being alive on the first day of the month, was not property of
the debtor's bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541). See also FIA. STAT. § 222.11 (1983) exempting
wages of the head of a household and In re Szuets, 22 Bankr. 805 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (holding that
debtor's interest in an individual retirement account was not exempt).
205
See, e.g., Roemelmeyer v. Gefen (In re Gefen), 35 Bankr. 368 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (FLA. STAT.
§ 222.14 (1983) exempts annuities, but the court held that an individual retirement account does not
qualify as an annuity). See also Omo REv.CODE Am. §§ 3911.10, 2329.66(6)(b), (10)(b) (Anderson1981),
which exempts a person's interest in an annuity.
20611 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A).
2071d.

U.S.C. § 522(b), modified, BAFJA, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 306(a) (1984).
No. 989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 75, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787,
5861; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 360, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5963, 6316, state that "some of the items that may be exempted under other federal laws include... '
20811

2095. REP.
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listed. 2' 0 The Eighth Circuit, for example, acknowledged that the "list was
not meant to be exclusive" but found "the failure of Congress to include ERISA
plan benefits probative of Congressional intent that ERISA was not a 'Federal law' upon which a [Bankruptcy Code] § 522(b)(2)(A) exemption could
be based."21 ' It also commented that "the pensions, wages, benefits and payments included in the illustrative list are all peculiarly federal in nature, created
by federal law or related to industries traditionally protected by federal government;" whereas, "ERISA regulates private pension systems."21 2 Thus, the
Eighth Circuit held that ERISA does not provide a federal nonbankruptcy
exemption.
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Eighth Circuit's conclusion. 2 3 The Fifth
Circuit was further persuaded that "Congress did not 'overlook' ERISA' when
it did not list it in the legislative history because of the "specific reference
in another subsection of Section 522 itself to the very ERISA provision relied upon by appellants as constituting a 'Federal law' exemption. 214 The court
is incorrect in that there is no specific reference to ERISA in the Bankruptcy
Code; however, it is true that some courts have held that the federal bankruptcy exemption in Bankruptcy Code section 522(d)(10)(E) for rights to plan
payments that are reasonably necessary for support can include rights to payment from an ERISA qualified plan. 2'5 It is further true that this federal
bankruptcy exemption does not apply to certain plans that are not qualified under some Internal Revenue Code provisions that were amended by
ERISA. 2' 6 But if this is a reference to ERISA, it is a very indirect one. The
2IOThe list is as follows:
Foreign Service Retirement and Disability payments, 22 U.S.C. 1104;

Social Security payments, 42 U.S.C. 407;
Injury or death compensation payments from war risk hazards, 42 U.S.C. 1717;
Wages of fishermen, seamen, and apprentices, 46 U.S.C. 601;
Civil service retirement benefits, 5 U.S.C. 729, 2265;
Longshoremens and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act death and disability benefits,
33 U.S.C. 916;
Railroad Retirement Act annuities and pensions, 45 U.S.C. 228(L);
Veterans benefits, 45 U.S.C. 352(E); [sic], [correct citation is 38 U.S.C. § 770 (g)];
Special pensions paid to winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor; 38 U.S.C.
3101; and
Federal homestead lands on debts contracted before issuance of the patent; 43 U.S.C.
175.
S. REP. No. 989, supra note 209, at 5861.
2iiSamore v. Graham (In re Graham) 726 F.2d 1268, 1274 (8th Cir. 1984).
2i21d .
2i3Goff

v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 582 n.23 (5th Cir. 1983). The court stated "[w]e find

that Congress did not intend ERISA.qualified plans among those 'exempt under Federal law, pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A)." Id. at 585.
2141d.
21511

U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E).

2.611 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E)(iii).
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court also mistakenly concluded that the ERISA requirements that plans prohibit benefits from being assigned or alienated are only conditions of obtaining qualified status for tax exemption. ERISA requires these plan provisions
in two places; one, for all plans subject to ERISA including some funded nonqualified plans, 217 and the other in the Internal Revenue Code provisions for
qualified plans. 218 Even though the court's logic can be disputed, the Fifth
Circuit did conclude nevertheless that Congress did not intend for ERISA
to provide a federal nonbankruptcy law exemption under Bankruptcy Code
section 522.
The Eleventh Circuit followed the reasoning of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits and concluded that the "failure to mention ERISA" in connection with
Bankruptcy Code section 522(b) was "intentional" and in connection with
29
the accompanying legislative history was "both purposeful and reasoned." 1
Thus, the court held that ERISA does not provide an exemption under other
applicable federal nonbankruptcy law for a debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified plan. The Ninth Circuit followed the holdings of the Fifth, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits. 220 Also, prior to the Eleventh Circuit's decision, The
Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida concurred with the Eighth
and the Fifth Circuits. 22' Bankruptcy courts for Kentucky, Oklahoma and Utah
have reached the same conclusion citing some or all of the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits. 222 The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan reluctantly followed the authority of the Eighth and Fifth Circuits
so that the debtor's interests in a profit-sharing and pension plan were not
exempt automatically but gave the debtor leave to claim the interests as ex223
empt under the federal bankruptcy exemptions.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia reached a similar
217ERISA § 206(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1974), modified, Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-369, § 104.
21
8I.R.C. § 401(a)(13), modified, Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 204.
219Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1491 (11th Cir. 1985).
22Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), No. 84-2142 (9th Cir. Sept. 20, 1985) (LEXIS,
Bkrtcy library, Cases file).
22Nixon v. P.J.
Pedone & Co. (In re Nichols), 42 Bankr. 772 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984).
2221n re Slezak, 63 Bankr. 625, 629 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986); In re Goldberg, 59 Bankr. 207 (Bankr.
N.D. Okla. 1986); McClean v. McClean (In re Kerr), 65 Bankr. 739 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986).
2231n re La Fata, 41 Bankr. 842, 843 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984). The bankruptcy judge stated:
I believe that the construction of the Goff court is rather strained, but after two
courts of appeal have adopted that line of analysis, it is imprudent to rule upon
another theory. Nevertheless, I do believe it is appropriate to outline a different
and, in my judgment, a more equitable approach.
This approach was to allow the debtor to amend his exemptions to claim his profit-sharing and pension plan benefits as reasonably necessary for support and thus, exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E).
See also supra Section III.B.1
of this article, entitled "Federal Bankruptcy Exemption (Bankruptcy Code
Section 522(d)(10)(E)):'
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conclusion with respect to a debtor's interest in a Keogh plan but based its
reasoning not on legislative history but instead on the purpose of the exemptions. 224 The court stated that "entitlements [to the] exemptions under 'Federal Law' other than § 522(d) as allowed by § 522(d)(2)(A) is limited to those
items specifically mentioned in the House and Senate Reports along with other
exemptions allowed under Federal law which are in the nature of periodic
payments that the debtor is presently receiving or entitled to receive and
not to a trust res designed for future periodic payment benefits" 225 Apparently, this court left open the issue as to whether a retired debtor could exempt benefits payable periodically from an ERISA qualified plan.
By contrast, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas reached
the reverse conclusion based upon the legislative history.226 First, the court
noted that the list of federal law exemptions "may be characterized as nothing more than prohibitions against assignment or alienation "227 Thus, the court
concluded: 'Although ERISA plan funds are not specifically mentioned in
the House Report, the similarity between the provisions of those statutes
that are recognized as constituting a federal exemption and the provisions
of 29 U.S.C. [Laborl § 1056 and § 26 U.S.C. 1I.R.C.] § 401(a)(13) (and the
accompanying Treasury regulations) support a conclusion that a federal ex28
emption for ERISA plans was intended.'2
Thus, the debtor can argue that ERISA is an applicable nonbankruptcy
"Federal law,' within the meaning of Bankruptcy Code section 522(b)(2)(A).
In most jurisdictions, the debtor has been unsuccessful with the argument.
Thus, when a debtor advances this exemption argument, the debtor should
argue it in the alternative after first arguing that ERISA or state law, or both,
229
preclude the interest from being property of the estate.
C. Do ERISA AND TE BANKRUm'CY CODE (AmAPPLICABLE NoNBAKIuPTCY
STATE LAW) CONFLICT IN A CHAPTER 7 CASE AND IF So, WICH PREVAILS?
Bankruptcy Code section 522(d)(10)(E) provides a federal bankruptcy exemption for a chapter 7 debtor's right to receive a payment from a plan to
the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent. If this exemption can apply to a debtor's interest in, or right to receive
a payment from, an ERISA qualified plan, then that ERISA plan right or
interest first must be property of the estate. Under this reasoning, the plan
224

Parkinson v. Bradford Trust Co. (In re O'Brien), 50 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985).
Id. at 79.
2261n re Hinshaw, 23 Bankr. 233 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982).
22

1271d.at 235.
2 8

2 1d"
229

See supra Section III.A.2 of this article, entitled "'Theory that ERISA is Applicable Nonbankruptcy Law," with respect to the property definition exclusion for certain trust interests subject to enforceable restrictions on transfer.
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right, as property of the estate, would be available to the trustee in bankruptcy
to pay administrative expenses and satisfy claims to the extent the plan rights
were not exempt because they were not reasonably necessary for support.
If an ERISA qualified plan interest or right is property of the estate, then
the reference in Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2) to a "restriction on the
transfer of a beneficial interest... that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law" would not include ERISA or the ERISA required provision
in that plan. However, ERISA requires a plan to provide that plan benefits
may not be assigned or alienated.230 The potential conflict then is between
the definition of property under the Bankruptcy Code and the two ERISA
requirements that plans must prohibit benefit assignment and alienation. This
conflict is raised by implication from the federal bankruptcy exemption for
certain rights to plan payments. The conflict is raised regardless of whether
the applicable state has opted-out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions, because the definition of property should not and does not fluctuate based upon
what exemptions are available to a chapter 7 debtor.
The potential conflict between the property definition in the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA is illustrated as follows. Assume that an ERISA required
plan provision prohibiting assignment and alienation is construed to mean
that a debtor-participant voluntarily could not assign to a creditor his or her
plan interest or right to receive a payment from the plan. Assume further
that the same debtor voluntarily could file a petition in bankruptcy to enable
the trustee in bankruptcy to reach the debtor's plan interest or right for the
benefit of the debtor's creditors. To allow the debtor to do indirectly through
the bankruptcy trustee what the debtor could not do directly would be inconsistent and would substantially undermine the effect of ERISA and the
required plan prohibition. Further, this interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code
would make it impossible for the plan to comply with the provisions of ERISA,
including the Internal Revenue Code provisions for qualified plans. A similar
inconsistency would occur if a creditor could not reach a debtor-participant's
plan right or interest in a garnishment or other collection action outside of
a bankruptcy case but indirectly could reach the plan right or interest by
filing a petition (alone or with other creditors) to place the debtor in bankruptcy
involuntarily.
If there is a potential conflict between ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code,
then an attempt should be made to harmonize the provisions of these two
statutes.23 ' This can be done in several ways. The first way to harmonize
the two statutes is to hold that a plan provision prohibiting benefit assign23S~e supra text and accompanying notes 90-91.
2

3IMorton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) ("The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose
among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of
the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective").
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ment or alienation, as required by ERISA, is a restriction against transfer
that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law, and to hold so because ERISA qualifies as applicable nonbankruptcy law that preempts any
state law that does not recognize the validity of such a plan provision. 232 Under
this holding, the ERISA qualified plan right or interest would not be property
of the estate. Then, the exemption in Bankruptcy Code section 522(d)(10)(E)
would be limited to (i) a debtor's right to receive a payment from a nonqualifled or disqualified plan if either the plan was not established by an insider
who employed the debtor or the payment was not on account of age or service, and (ii) a debtor's right to receive a payment from a qualified annuity,
plan, or contract that is not required by ERISA to contain a provision prohibiting assignment of plan benefits, such as an individual retirement account
233
or annuity or certain church or government plans.
A second way to harmonize the statutes is to recognize the potential overlap of the statutes but to conclude that the overlap does not necessarily mean
that the plan interest or right is property. 234 This line of thinking would
eliminate the conflict only if the Bankruptcy Code also is construed to mean
that the plan interest or right is not property of the estate. Thus, if ERISA
23
qualifies as applicable nonbankruptcy law, the conflict would be eliminated. 5
Further, if state law qualifies as applicable nonbankruptcy law and a debtor's
interest in an ERISA qualified plan is subject to a restriction on transfer that
is enforceable under the applicable state law, then the conflict would be eliminated in that case. 236 However, if the Bankruptcy Code is construed to mean
that the plan interest or right is property of the estate because there is no
applicable bankruptcy law or the applicable nonbankruptcy law does not enforce the ERISA required provision prohibiting assignment and alienation,
then there would be a statutory conflict that was not harmonized.
232See supra Section lII.A.2 of this article, entitled "Theory that ERISA is Applicable Nonbankruptcy Law" and infra text and accompanying notes 254-55.
233
ERISA § 201, 29 U.S.C. § 1051 excludes plans not funded by employer contributions, excludes

individual retirement accounts and annuities and certain retirement bonds, and excludes excess benefit
plans. See ERISA §§ 3(32), (33), (36), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(32), (33), (36) for definitions. ERISA § 4(b),
29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) excludes governmental plans, certain church plans, and also excess benefit plans.
Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(a) (1978) excludes governmental plans, certain church plans and plans that do
not provide for employer contributions, discussed supra note 92.
23
4Clotfelter v. Ciba.Geigy Corp. (In re Threewitt), 24 Bankr. 927, 930 (D. Kan. 1982), rev'g 20 Bankr.
434 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982).
23
The conflict was eliminated in Threewitt, supra note 234.
236
See McLean v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985),
a chapter 13 case which held that there was no conflict with the Bankruptcy Code between the property
definition in 11 U.S.C. § 541(c) and the exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). The court concluded
that the exemption applied to the debtor's right to receive payments from a plan that was not subject
to an enforceable restriction on transfer under state law. Further, the court held that the debtor's benefits
were subject to an enforceable restriction and were not property of the chapter 13 estate. Thus, there
was no conflict between ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code.
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The third way to harmonize the statutes is to hold that the ERISA required prohibition only applies to assignments and alienations by the debtor
and not to garnishments or other collection actions by judgment creditors.237
First, this interpretation would undermine severely the meaning of the ERISA
requirements that plans prohibit the assignment and alienation of benefits
with respect to all debtors in nonbankruptcy garnishment or other collection
proceedings and would conflict with current nonbankruptcy cases construing ERISA and the required plan provisions. 23 8 Second, it could result in a
dual definition of property under the Bankruptcy Code, so that rights under
ERISA qualified plans would not be property of a debtor's bankruptcy estate when the debtor "voluntarily" filed a petition in bankruptcy but would
be property of the estate when a creditor or creditors filed the petition placing the debtor in bankruptcy "involuntarily."
If the statutes cannot be harmonized by a reasonable interpretation, then
the two statutes conflict and one must prevail. Implied repeal or amendment
is, however, disfavored by courts, 239 and is used only as a last resort and only
to the extent necessary to resolve the conflict.
Since the Bankruptcy Code was enacted after ERISA, the general rule
would be that the Bankruptcy Code impliedly repealed or amended any inconsistent portions of ERISA. Under this rule if the Bankruptcy Code conflicts with the ERISA required prohibitions against assignment or alienation,
then the Bankruptcy Code impliedly repealed these ERISA prohibitions in
a bankruptcy case so that the debtor's plan interests or rights could be property
of the estate. 240 As property of the debtor's estate, the plan interests or rights,
or the proceeds thereof, potentially could be sold, assigned, or paid by the
trustee in bankruptcy to the debtor's creditors. However, on June 29, 1984,
the Bankruptcy Code was amended, and thereafter on August 13, 1984, the
anti-alienation provisions of ERISA were amended by the Retirement Equity
Act of 1984 ("REA'). 24, REA amended the ERISA requirements that plans
must prohibit benefit alienation and assignment by adding an exception to
ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code. 242 The exception allows a court to
2

37National Bank of N. Am. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local No. 3, 69 A.D.2d 679, 419 N.Y.S.2d
127 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979), appeal dismissed for raootness, 48 N.Y.2d 752, 397 N.E.2d 1333, 422 N.Y.S.2d
666 (N.Y. 1979).
238
5ee cases discussed supra note 108.
2"9E.g., Radzanower v. Touche Ross, 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976) citing United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976).
240E.g., Gray v. Ingles Markets, Inc. Employees' Stock Bonus Plan & Trust (In re De Weese), 47 Bankr.
251, 256 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985).
241Pub. L. No. 98-397. See Bishop v. Masters (In re Masters), No. 386-01365-P7, slip op. at 9 (Bankr.
D. Ore. May 6, 1987) (LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file) (where the court stated that the REA amendment weakens the argument of an amendment by implication and concluded that "Congress passed two
statutes with potentially conflicting provisions.")
242Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, §§ 104, 204, modifying ERISA § 206(d) (1975),
I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1984).
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order a plan to pay a participant's benefits directly to a spouse, former spouse,
child, or dependent and also allows a court to approve an agreement by a
plan participant assigning those plan benefits to such spouse or such others.
This raises two possibilities. The first is that the enactment of REA regarding the permitted exception for payments to spouses and others reenforces
a conclusion that the ERISA requirements that plans prohibit assignment and
alienation were not repealed or amended to any extent by implication by the
Bankruptcy Code. The second is that REA added another exception to ERISA
in addition to an exception already added by the Bankruptcy Code through
implied repeal or amendment-that exception that was already added being
that ERISA does not require that plans prohibit a debtor's benefits from being assigned and alienated through a bankruptcy proceeding.
The Bankruptcy Code amended specific portions of ERISA that referred
to the word "bankruptcy," to "the Bankruptcy Act:' or to "that Act."243 Thus,
the impact of the Bankruptcy Code on certain provisions of ERISA was considered and amendments were made. To hold that a significant aspect of ERISA
was repealed by implication when other less significant provisions of ERISA
were specifically amended would be unusual.2 44 Further, the ERISA prohibitions against alienation were specifically discussed during a 1975 Congressional Hearing, 245 so that the fact that ERISA was not amended specifically
by the Bankruptcy Code may have been intentional; thereby precluding a
repeal or amendment by implication. During the time of the 1975 hearing
referred to above and discussed below in detail, the proposed definition of
property of a debtor's bankruptcy estate would have excluded a debtor's beneficial interest in a trust which was subject to an enforceable restriction against
transfer only to the extent "of the income reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and his dependent ' 246 Thus, under the Commission's
proposal, a debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified plan would have been
property of'the estate to the extent the income of the plan was not reasonably necessary for support. How much, if any, of a debtor's plan interest or
right would be "income" was unclear. Further, the Commission's proposal
243Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 321.
244
" However, the United States District Court of South Carolina in a chapter 13 case stated that "Is]mce
the amendments [in the Bankruptcy Code] to other acts were merely technical in nature, it should not
be considered an indication that Congress intended to preclude a finding of repeal by implication." Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Health & Welfare Pension Fund v. Stephenson (In re McLean), 41 Bankr.
893 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1984). This decision finding an implied repeal was reversed by the Fourth Circuit.
McLean v. Central States S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985).
2
4'Hearingson S. 235 and 236 before the Subcomm. on Improvements inJudicial Machinery of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 664, 678 (1975) (statement of John J. Creedon, Amencan
Life Insurance Association).
24 6
REPORT OF COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., COMM. REP. § 4-601(b), repnnted
in 2 App. L. KINo, K. KLEE & R. LEVIN, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 147-48 (15th ed. 1984).
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provided an exemption for a debtor's rights under a profit-sharing, pension,
stock bonus, annuity, or similar plan established for the primary purpose of
providing benefits upon retirement by reason of age, health, or length of service
if the plan were qualified under Internal Revenue Code section 401 or were
established by federal or state statute, but only to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and his or her dependents. 247 Thus under
the Commissions proposal, to the extent the interest was income and reasonably necessary for support, the plan interest would be excluded from the estate, and to the extent the interest was income that was not reasonably
necessary for support, it would be included, non-exempt property of the estate. Further under the proposal, to the extent a debtor's interest in an ERISA
trust was not income of the trust, it would be exempt property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate to the extent reasonably necessary for support if the
plan were qualified or established by federal or state statute.
With respect to the 1975 proposal, John J. Creedon, chairman of a committee of the American Life Insurance Association ('ALIA") and senior vice
president and general counsel of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company of
New York gave a statement to the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery in 1975. Then the following dialogue was reported:
Senator Burdick. What provision would you recommend
to reconcile the provisions of the Employees [sic] Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 with section 4-503(c)(6) of the
Commission's bill and 4-503(e)(5) of the judge's bill [the exemption provision]?
Mr. Creedon. This I guess had to do with the fact that
ERISA provides that a pension benefit is not assignable and
the Commission's bill would allow an exemption only with
respect to that portion of the pension plan that is necessary
for the bankrupt's maintenance.
I guess something could be put in the Bankruptcy Act
to the effect that notwithstanding the provision in ERISA
248
or otherwise the trustee will be able to get to the excess.
At the same time, Mr. Creedon commented upon the proposed exemption
for plan rights and stated, "there is in both bills [the Commission's and judge's
bills] presently an exemption for payments made under section 401(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code. We believe that the bills should also exempt pension
benefits under other sections of the Internal Revenue Code. In other words,
7

24 REPopT OF COMMISSION ON THE BA KRUPTcY LAWS OF THE U.S., COMm. REP. § 4-503(c)(6),

ed in2482 App. L. KINO, K. KLEE & R. LEVIN, CoLuER ON BANKRtiTcy 125 (15th ed. 1984).
Hearings, supra note 245.
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all qualified plans should be exempt.' 249 He also responded as follows to the
following written question:
Question 2. Why do you believe that it is more equitable to include in the proposed exemptions all pension plans
qualifying under section 401, 403, 408 or 409 of the Internal
Revenue Code rather than just section 401(a)?
Answer. Retirement benefits can be provided in different ways, such as under (1) a trust forming part of a pension
plan qualifying under § 401 of the Internal Revenue Code,
(2) an employee annuity plan qualifying under § 403, (3) individual retirement accounts qualifying under § 408, and (4)
the accumulation of retirement bonds as contemplated by §
409. Each of the tax qualified retirement plans has been recognized by Congress as a means of encouraging retirement planning. ALIA does not believe the availability of an exemption
in respect of retirement income should depend on the choice
or chance of the retirement benefit program. If any exemption for retirement benefits is warranted it would seem that
benefits pursuant to any tax qualified plan should be recognized - although different plans require different kinds of
250
exemptions.
Ultimately, the definition of property was amended so that a debtor's
beneficial interest in a trust subject to an enforceable restriction against alienation is excluded from being property of the estate, whether or not income
and whether or not reasonably necessary for support. 251 Further, the federal
bankruptcy exemption was amended so that it does not apply to a debtor's
rights under certain nonqualified or disqualified plans. Thus, the exemption
applies to a debtor's right to receive payments from a plan unless the payment (i) is from a plan not qualified under certain sections of the Internal
Revenue Code, (ii) is from a plan that is established by insiders, and (iii) is
payable on account of age or length of service. Therefore, the 1975 Committee Report does not confirm a conflict between the Bankruptcy Code adopted in 1978 and ERISA, because ERISA was not amended and because both
the proposed definition of property of a debtor's bankruptcy estate and the
proposed exemption were amended in a way that could resolve any potential
conflict. The legislative history does not give any insight as to why the reasonably necessary support limitation was deleted from the definition of property.
249
1 Hearings, supra
250

note 245, at 665.
Hearings, supra note 245, at 679.
2111 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2).
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For example, the speaker introducing a House amendment which resulted in
this change in the definition of property, and many other changes, summarily
commented that "Section 541(c)(2) follows the position taken in the House
bill and rejects the position taken in the Senate amendment with respect to
income limitations on a spendthrift trust' 25 2 Further, the legislative history
does not explain why the exemption was changed from exempting certain qualified plan rights to exempting certain plan rights other than from certain nonqualified or disqualified plans. The House Report, for example, merely states
that "certain benefits that are akin to future earnings of the debtor" are exempt which include "benefits under a certain stock bonus, pension, profit,
sharing, annuity or similar plan based on illness, disability, death, age or length
of service," with no references to qualified or nonqualified or disqualified
2 3
plans. 5
Thus, there is a potential overlap or conflict between the federal bankruptcy exemption and ERISA. There is not necessarily an overlap or conflict between the Bankruptcy Code definition of property and ERISA. The conflict
can be avoided by excluding ERISA qualified plan interests from being property
of the estate and by limiting the federal bankruptcy exemption under Bankruptcy Code section 522(d)(10)(E) to certain rights from plans that are not required by ERISA to prohibit benefit assignment and alienation and to certain
withdrawal rights under ERISA qualified plans. However, not all courts have
interpreted the property definition in a manner that is consistent with ERISA.
Further, when bankruptcy or other courts construe an ERISA required
plan provision as not being enforceable under state law, there is a conflict
or inconsistency with the ERISA preemption provisions. ERISA preempts
state law as it relates to employee benefit plans.254 The problem is somewhat
circular because ERISA does not preempt other federal laws, 25s so that ERISA
would not preempt federal bankruptcy law from relating to a debtor's interest
in an ERISA qualified plan. For example, ERISA would not preempt the
Bankruptcy Code from specifically including a debtor's interest in an ERISA
qualified plan, but the Bankruptcy Code does not do this. Instead, the
Bankruptcy Code defers to "applicable nonbankruptcy law," to determine
whether a debtor's interest in a trust, which is part of an ERISA qualified
2S212 4 CONG. REc. H11089 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Hon. Don Edwards introducing
House amend, to Senate amend, to H.RL 8200), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CoNG. &AD. N ws 6436,6455.
2 3
1 H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 362, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
5963, 6318.
254ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "related to"
so that a state "law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a
connection with or reference to such a plan" and the state action is not "too tenuous, remote, or peripheral in manner to warrant a fmding that the law 'relates to" the plan:' Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463
U.S. 85, 96-97, 100 n.21 (1983).

25SERISA § 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d).
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plan, is subject to an enforceable restriction against transfer. Further ERISA
would not preempt a bankruptcy court or other court from interpreting applicable nonbankruptcy law to refer only to state law and not to federal laws,
such as ERISA. 25 6 ERISA, however, should preempt any state law that would
render the ERISA qualified provisions against transfer, assignment, or alienation uneforceable. 257 Thus, a debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified plan
256

Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir. 1984) ("while ERISA-required
anti-alienation clauses may preempt state law and preclude the use of judgment enforcement devices provided
thereunder, they do not preclude inclusion of pension benefits in a debtor's bankruptcy estate by operation of federal law"); In re Ridenour, 45 Bankr. 72, 77 (Bankr. ED. Tenn. 1984) ("ERISA does not preempt
the federal law which defines the § 541(c)(2) exclusion as applying only to trusts qualifying as valid spendthrift trusts under relevant state law"). In re Pettit, 61 Bankr. 341, 345 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1986) ("Examination of state law for validity under state spendthrift trust law is not an application of federal bankruptcy
law which mandates such an examination").
257
1 For a discussion of the extent of ERIS.As preemption of state law, see, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (ERISA preempts the New York Human Rights Law, regarding employment discrimination, to the extent it prohibits practices that are lawful under federal law; ERISA does
not preempt the New York Disability Benefits Law, regarding the requirement that employers provide
certain benefits to employees unable to work because of nonoccupational illness or injury, but New York
may not enforce the Disability Benefits Law through regulation of benefits plans covered by ERISA);
Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1985) (ERISA preempts New York from requiring an employer to pay severance benefits at least where the employer has a severance pay plan which
is an ERISA welfare plan; instead ERISA grants the employees a remedy to determine whether their
employer arbitrarily denied them a benefit under said severance pay plan; Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Dept. of
Indus. Labor & Human Relations, 599 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031 (1980) (ERISA
does not preempt the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act because to do so would violate the ERISA prohibition against altering, amending, modifying, invalidating, impairing, or superseding another federal law
(Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978)
(ERISA preempts California's Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975, which regulates funding, disclosure, and other areas involving health care service plans, to the extent it seeks to regulate employee benefit plans covered by ERISA), affg 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
831 (1978); Clotfelter v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. (In re Threewitt), 24 Bankr. 927, 929 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982)
("this Court is persuaded that Congress intended that general creditors not reach a debtor's interest in
an ERISA pension fund, and intended to preempt any state law to the contrary"); Commercial Mortgage
Ins. Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510, 516 (N.D. Tex. 1981) ("ERISAs assignment-alienation
prohibition creates a general federal exemption of pension benefits from commercial creditor's claims and
preempts otherwise relevant state law"). See also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550,
552 n.3 (11 Cir. 1985) (ERISA does not preclude the application of equitable principles under state law
to allow an employer or subrogee to reach an employee's benefits, when the employer's claim resulted
from the employee's criminal conduct) (discussed supra note 103); Savings & Profit-Sharing Fund of Sears
Employees v. Gago, 717 F.2d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1983) (where the court stated that "[elven though
not generally preempted by section 514, state law may still be preempted because of a direct conflict
with a more specific section of ERISA' such as the section that requires plans to prohibit assignment
or alienation. The case involved the division of an interest in a plan pursuant to a property settlement
and divorce and was decided before the enactment of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-397, § 104 (codified at ERISA § 514(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7)), which specifically amended the
ERISA preemption of state law to allow benefit assignment and alienation pursuant to qualified domestic
relations orders).
Nevertheless, some courts have considered alimony, child support, community property interests, and
divorce property settlements to be exceptions to the ERISA requirement that plans prohibit assignment
and alienation, so that applicable state law governing the enforcement of such rights and interests against
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should be excluded from being property of the debtor's estate either because
ERISA is applicable nonbankruptcy law which renders enforceable the required restriction on transfer or because state law is applicable nonbankruptcy law and ERISA preempts such state law from not enforcing the ERISA
required restriction on transfer. To hold otherwise would conflict with the
ERISA preemption of state law; unless the Bankruptcy Code also amended
the ERISA preemption of state law by implication.2 58 Thus, a conflict exists
because of inconsistent judicial interpretations of both of these statutes. These
conflicts should be resolved by legislation or by the Supreme Court so that
there is a uniform interpretation of the uniform law of bankruptcy authorized
by the United States Constitution; 2 9 a uniform interpretation of what constitutes an enforceable restriction on the transfer of a trust interest under
applicable nonbankruptcy law within the meaning of Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2); a uniform interpretation of the ERISA required plan prohibition of assignment or alienation; and a uniform interpretation of the ERISA
preemption provisions.
a participant's plan interest would not be preempted by ERISA. ERISA has been amended to codify the
effect of these cases when the order is a qualified domestic relations order under state law so that such
an order will not be preempted by ERISA and so that benefits can be assigned and alienated pursuant
to such orders. Retirement Equity Act, Pub. L. No. 98-397, §§ 104, 204 (codified at BRISA §§ 206(d);
514(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056(d), 1144(b)(7); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)), discussed supra note 102.
Some courts in some bankruptcy cases also have relied upon state law to include a debtor's interest
in an ERISA qualified plan in the debtor's bankruptcy estate, notwithstanding or without considering
the ERISA preemption ofstate law relating to such plans. See cases discussed supra text and accompanying notes 138, 146, 151.
21t should be noted that when Congress wanted state law relating to ERISA qualified plans to be
allowed, it has amended specifically, and not by implication, the ERISA provision that would preempt
such state law. E.g., Retirement Equity Act, Pub. L. No. 98-397, § 104 (codified at ERISA § 514(b)(7),
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7)), providing that qualified domestic relations orders under state law are not preempted
(discussed supra note 102).
US. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 4 only empowers Congress to enact "uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.. 7 Only geographical uniformity is required. In re Sullivan,
680 F.2d 1131, 1133 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 992 (1982). Further, the Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Ohio stated that: "The uniformity which is required by the Constitution
relates to the law itself and not to its results upon the varying rights of debtor and creditor under the
laws of the several states." Central Bank v. Ambrose (In re Ambrose), 4 Bankr. 395, 398 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1980), citing Thomas v. Woode, 173 F. 585 (8th Cir. 1909). See also In re Elsea, 47 Bankr. 142,
148 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985), where the court noted:
This reference to state law may cause more problems than it solves. ERISA and
§ 401 of the IRC reveal Congress' intent that a person's interest in a qualified pension plan should not be subject to the claims of his creditors without regard to which
state the person resides in. On the basis of slim evidence, the courts would hold
that in bankruptcy cases various inconsistent state laws determine whether interests
in qualified plans are protected from claims of the beneficiaries' creditors. The interest of a beneficiary in one state might be protected while the interest of another
beneficiary of the same plan might not be protected because he lived in a different
state.
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PROBLEMS WHEN PLAN INTERESTS ARE INCLUDED AS NON-EXEMPT
PROPERTY OF THE CHAPTER 7 DEBTOR'S ESTATE

If a chapter 7 debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified plan is property
of the estate and all of the interest is not exempt, then there are other problems
relating to the ERISA qualified plan and the bankruptcy case. Problems can
arise concerning (i) how much of a debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified
plan can be used to pay administrative expenses and to satisfy claims and
(ii) how and when it can be so used. These problems can arise, for example,
if the debtor's interest is not vested totally when the case commences or if
the interest is not distributable in whole or in part until a future date. Problems
also can arise involving various income tax consequences to various persons
or entities.
Assuming that a chapter 7 debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified plan
can be property of the debtor's estate, then one question is how much of
that interest can be property of the estate. The answer in the Bankruptcy
Code appears to be that it is the debtor's interest in the ERISA qualified
plan as of the commencement of the chapter 7 case that can be property of the
debtor's estate. 260 To determine a debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified plan,
including its value, both as of a particular time such as the commencement
of the bankruptcy case, one should consider the type of ERISA qualified plan
involved and the applicable vesting provisions. In a defined contribution plan,
a debtor would have an account funded by employer contributions. That account would be credited from time to time with employer contributions and
plan earnings, and in certain cases, could be credited with forfeitures from
any nonvested portions of terminated participants' accounts. In addition, that
account would be reduced from time to time by plan expenses and losses.
Further, at any particular time the debtor might not be vested totally or partially in this account. 261 Thus, if all or any portion of a debtor's interest in
a defined contribution plan is not exempt property of the chapter 7 debtor's
estate, a determination must be made as to whether future employer contributions or any forfeitures allocable to the participant's account for periods
of time after the case commences will be included in or excluded from the
chapter 7 debtor's estate. They should be excluded, and at least one bankruptcy
26011 U.S.C. § 541.
26
1See ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1984), modified, Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-369, § 102; I.R.C. §§ 411 (1984), modified, Retirement Equity Act of 1984, § 202; I.R.C. § 416(b)
regarding minimum vesting requirements. Prior to normal retirement age, a participant's vested interest
will be determined based upon the vesting schedule in the plan that meets one of the required minimum
vesting schedules or that provides faster vesting. Vesting generally depends upon the number of years
of service for which a participant has been credited. A year of service is generally a specified 12 month
period for which a participant is paid for at least 1,000 hours of service, determined by counting actual
hours or using certain equivalencies or elapsed time periods. 29 C.F.R. § 2530.200b (1984). See supra
note 30.
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court has held SO.262 Similarly, a determination must be made as to whether
any future plan earnings or losses allocated to the participant's account in
the defined contribution plan for periods of time after the case commences
will be included in or excluded from the chapter 7 debtor's estate. They should
be included, and at least one bankruptcy court has held so. 263 Also, a deter
mination must be made as to how any increases to the vested percentage
of the debtor's account in a defined contribution plan that occur after the
bankruptcy case commences will affect the amount of the interest that is included in the chapter 7 debtor's bankruptcy estate. For example, the debtor's
vested percentage could increase after the case commences in accordance with
the terms of the plan if the debtor is credited with additional service for his
or her employer or attains his or her normal retirement date or other event
specified in the plan. Thus, a determination must be made as to whether
the estate will be limited to the debtor's vested interest, determined as of
the date the case commenced, in the debtor's account in the defined contribution plan or whether the bankruptcy estate will include and be increased
by any increases in the debtor's vested percentage. It should be limited to
262

Parkinson v. Bradford Trust Co. (In re O'Brien), 50 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (self-employed

debtor's postpetition contributions to a Keogh plan, plus earnings thereon, were not property of her bankruptcy estate under chapter 7).
See also 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(6) which excludes "earnings from services performed by the individual
after the commencement of the case"; In re Haynes, 679 E2d 718 (7th Cir. 1982) (debtor's Navy retirement pay was considered compensation for services performed after the bankruptcy petition was filed
because of the obligations imposed on the debtor as a condition precedent to receipt of retirement pay
- i.e., the debtor must report for a physical examination every four years and could be called for up to
two months active duty every four years or in the event of war or national emergency).
But see 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7) which states that the debtor's estate includes "[a]ny interest in property
that the estate acquires after the commencement of the case" The answer to the question posed in the
text depends, in part, upon the interpretation of the phrase "property that the estate acquires" within
the meaning of said subsection (7). The legislative history to the Bankruptcy Code provides that the
new section 541(a)(7):
clarifies that any interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement of the case is property of the estate; for example if the estate enters into a
contract, after the commencement of the case, such a contract would be property
of the estate. The addition of this provision by the House amendment merely clari,
fies that section 541(a) is an all-embracing definition which includes charges on
property, such as liens held by the debtor on property of a third party, or beneficial
rights and interests that the debtor may have in property of another. However,
only the debtor's interest in such property becomes property of the estate. If the
debtor holds bare legal title or holds property in trust for another, only those rights
which the debtor would have otherwise had emanating from such interest pass to
the estate under section 541.
124 CoNG. Rac. H11089 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Hon. Don Edwards introducing House
amend, to Senate amend. to H.R. 8200), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News 6436, 6455.
26311 U.S.C. § 541(6). Parkinson v. Bradford Trust Co. (In re O'Brien), 50 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1985) (the bankruptcy trustee is entitled to receive all prepetition contributions to the self-employed debtors Keogh plan, plus earnings thereon until the date such amounts are turned over to the bankruptcy trustee).
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the debtor's vested interest when the case commences, and at least one case
264
has held so.
By contrast, in a defined benefit plan, a participant does not have an account (except in the case of certain rollover or voluntary contributions). Instead, the participant has an accrued benefit, which could be a fraction of
his or her retirement benefit at his or her normal retirement date.265 The fraction generally is determined based on a ratio of actual years of participation
to the total years of participation the participant would have at normal retirement date. 266 In addition, a participant will have a vested percentage in his
or her accrued benefit derived from employer contributions as of the date
the case commences. This vested percentage could increase after the case
commences in accordance with the terms of the plan if the debtor is credited
with additional service for his or her employer or attains his or her normal
retirement date or other event specified in the plan. 267 A debtor's accrued
benefit in the plan will not change by reason of plan earnings, expenses, or
losses or additional employer contributions; however, it can change by reason of changes in the participant's average compensation, number of years
of service, or number of years of participation. If the debtor's interest in a
defined benefit plan is included in the debtor's chapter 7 estate, a determination must be made as to whether the debtor's interest in the defined benefit
plan will be limited to (a) the debtor's vested percentage in (b) the debtor's
accrued benefit, both calculated as of the date the chapter 7 case commences,
or instead, whether increases in the debtor's vested percentage in the debtor's accrued benefit will be included in and increase the debtor's estate. The
estate should be so limited to the debtor's vested percentages of the debtor's
accrued benefit when the case commences rather than reflecting increase in
68
vesting or accrued benefits.2
A debtor also may have an account or benefit in a defined contribution
or defined benefit plan derived from the debtor's contributions to the plan,
and plan earnings, expenses, and losses allocable thereto, which will be 100
264

Samore v. Independent Pension Services, Inc. (In re McKenna), 58 Bankr. 221 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1985). In re Clark, 711 F.2d 21, 23 (3d Cir. 1983). See supra note 262.
26
sERISA §§ 3(23)(A), 204(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(23), 1054(c)(3).
66
2 See generally ERISA § 3(23)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(A); ERISA § 204, 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (1975),
modified, Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 102; I.R.C. § 411(a)(7), (b), modified Tax Reform
Act of 1984, § 205. See also ERISA § 204(b)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(C); I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(C).
A year of participation may be dependent upon the employee being a participant during a plan year and
it also may be dependent upon the participant being credited with a minimum number of hours of paid
service during specified 12 month periods. Alternative methods for accruing benefits are specified in ERISA
§ 204(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b).
267
See supra note 261.
56
2 But see 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(7) and supra note 262.
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percent vested.269 With respect to such employee contribution account, a
determination must be made as to whether allocations of future plan earnings, expenses, or losses to this account for periods of time after the case
commences will be included or excluded from the debtor's estate. They should
be included.27o
In addition, the value of a debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified plan
may depend upon whether the debtor is married and what rights the debtor's spouse has to receive any of the debtor's plan benefits. In some cases,
the spouse of the participant-debtor may have the right to receive a survivor
annuity payable in the event of the debtor's death. 27 1 This survivor annuity
would affect the value of the debtor's interest payable during the debtor's
lifetime and the form in which the debtor's benefits would be payable and
to whom. Further, the spouse may have the right to prevent the participantdebtor from receiving plan benefits in a form other than a qualified joint and
survivor annuity.27 2 This in turn would affect when and how much of the
debtor's benefits could be used to pay administrative expenses and satisfy
claims.
Once the issue is resolved as to how much or what percentage of the debtor's account balance or accrued benefit is included in the debtor's bankrupt
cy estate at any time after the case commences, then the next question is
how and when the debtor's interest will be used to pay administrative ex
penses and satisfy claims. For example, must the bankruptcy trustee keep
the bankruptcy case open until all ERISA qualified plan payments are received
or can the bankruptcy trustee transfer to a creditor the debtor's future rights
to receive payments or rights to receive future payments, as the case may
be? If the trustee can transfer the debtor's rights to receive payments, must
the creditor accept the rights in lieu of cash payments? And must assignment of the plan interest be pro-rata as to all creditors of similar priority,
unless the creditors otherwise agree? Further, if the creditor accepts an assignment of the ERISA qualified plan interest, what remedies does the creditor have, and against whom, if the trustee of the ERISA qualifed plan refuses
to pay the creditor and instead pays the debtor when the debtor becomes
269ERISA § 203(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(1); I.R.C. § 411(a)(1).
Alternatively, in a defined benefit plan, a participant's accrued benefit from employee contributions
may be expressed as a percentage of the participant's total accrued benefit rather than as a separate account with allocable plan earnings and losses. ERISA § 204(c)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1054(c)(2); I.R.C. § 411(c)(2).
27011 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1979), modified, BAFJA, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 456(a)(5) (1984).
271ERISA § 205, 29 US.C. § 1055, modified, Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397,
§ 103; I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(11), 417, modified or added, Retirement Equity Act of 1984, § 203. In a profitsharing plan, the plan instead might provide for a distribution to the surviving spouse in a lump sum
rather than in the form of an annuity.
272Id. If the participant's accrued benefits did not exceed $3,500, distribution could be made to the
participant without the spouse's consent. Whether the participant has been married for less than one
year also may be a factor.
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entitled to receive plan benefits. Further, what happens if the debtor's spouse
also has a right to receive, or to elect to receive, certain benefits from the
plan or the right to prevent the debtor's benefits from being payable in a manner
other than a qualified joint and survivor annuity? 273 In addition, as of the
date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, if the debtor has the power to
terminate an ERISA qualifed plan and to allow current distributions of plan
274
benefits, will the bankruptcy trustee be authorized to exercise the power?
And if the power can be exercised and the exercise of the power increases
the debtor's vested interest from what it was as of the time of the filing of
the bankruptcy petition, will the debtor's bankruptcy estate include any increase in vesting resulting from the plan termination?
The answers to these questions are unclear. One judge speculated that
if the court had not decided that an employed debtor's pension plan interest
was exempt, then the "trustee would have to keep the case open indefinitely
waiting for the debtor to retire" and if the debtor had died the trustee would
have received nothing under the particular plan.275 In that case, the debtor's
interest in the employer's pension plan was exempt but his interest in the
employer's profit-sharing plan was not exempt; however, the debtor had the
right to withdraw up to onehalf of his annual profit share and to request
his funds in the profitsharing plan for hardship and certain other reasons.
Thus, the inclusion of the debtor's profit-sharing plan interest as property
of his bankruptcy estate that was not exempt did not present the problems
discussed above, because the bankruptcy trustee should have been able to
receive the profit-sharing plan funds by exercising the debtor's withdrawal
rights.
In another case, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama ordered the trustee of a profit-sharing plan to pay over to the bankruptcy
trustee an amount of the debtor's vested interest that was not exempt under
an Alabama statute exempting personal property. 276 Whether the plan trustee
had the authority to pay over the funds is questionable because the debtor
did not have the absolute right to withdraw his vested balance except upon
death, disability, or retirement. 277 Nevertheless, as the court noted "[a]pparently, the employer... and the trustee of the retirement trust have agreed
to allow ... [the debtor] to maintain his account in an amount equal to the

portion of the subject funds that are determined to be within his allowable
273

See supra text and accompanying notes 271, 272.
174For a discussion of the effect of this type of power by the debtor under state law regarding whether
a debtor's interest is property of the bankruptcy estate, see supra text and accompanying notes 138-42.
275
1n re Miller, 33 Bankr. 549, 553 n.l (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983), discussed supra at text accompanying
note 176, 179-80.
276
Rodgers v. Norman (In re Crenshaw), 44 Bankr. 31 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984). ALA. CODE § 6-10-6
(Supp. 1983) allows a resident to exempt up to $3,000 of personal property.
277

Crenshaw, supra note 276, at 31.
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exemption."278 Whether this means that the profit-sharing plan was amended to allow the distribution of the nonexempt portion is unclear. Further,
the amount the court directed the plan trustee to turn over was based upon
the value of the debtor's vested interest as of the date of the filing of the
bankruptcy petition, and thus, apparently did not include any income (or loss)
allocated to the debtor's vested interest from the time of the filing of the
bankruptcy petition in 1983 until the court's decision in October of 1984.
In a third case, 50 percent of the debtor's pension benefits, which he was
receiving at least annually, was not exempt. 279 In that case, the court held
that the trustee should collect 50 percent of the payments from the date of
the filing of the debtor's petition and hold them until the claim of his exwife/creditor was determined and until further court order. The court, in
a footnote, cited to the Report of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of
United States and stated:
Although the Congressional reports are silent as to what steps
a [bankruptcy] trustee should take once the court finds there
is an excess of the pension payments to which the estate is
entitled, the Commission Report, part II, at 151 suggests the
trustee may 'sell the right to the excess income, or reach the
principal... subject, of course, to the rights of any third per8
sons in the principal.'2 0
This court, however, did not answer the questions of when and how to pay
administrative expenses and satisfy claims, because the creditor's claim had
not yet been determined.
In another case, a debtor's interest in his employer's stock bonus plan,
funded by employer contributions, primarily in the form of common stock of
the employer, was held to be property of the debtor's estate. 28 ' The debtor
had no right to borrow or withdraw from the plan and could not receive a
distribution except upon disability, retirement, death, or break in service
through termination of employment. The court concluded that because of
the uncertainties as to when the debtor's interest might be payable and what
it might be worth then and because of its nominal present value, the trustee
either should liquidate or should abandon the debtor's vested rights in the
2781d. at 35.
279 arren v. Taff (In re Taff), 10 Bankr. 101 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
2901d. at 107 n.14.
2S'Gray v. Ingles Markets, Inc. Employees" Stock Bonus Plan & Trust (In re De Weese), 47 Bankr.
251 (Bankr. \V.D.N.C. 1985). See also In re Brooks, 60 Bankr. 155, 160 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986) (where
the court held that the debtor's interest in a profit-sharing plan was property of the estate and was not
exempt but stated in note 4 "[o]f course, a bankruptcy trustee can acquire no greater rights in property
than the debtor possessed. [cite omitted] Dr. Brooks apparently has no present rights of withdrawal or
rights to receive payments out of corpus')
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plan. Thus, in some cases the interest may be property of the estate but the
bankruptcy trustee may choose to abandon it. Accordingly, the issue of
whether or how to liquidate a debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified plan
or otherwise use it to pay administrative expenses and satisfy claims is not
an easy question and is one that bankruptcy trustees and judges will have
to face when and if ERISA plan interests are not excluded or exempted
property.
Another problem is that ERISA qualified plan benefits are also subject
to federal and, in certain cases, state income taxes when distributed. Further, the benefits may be subject to income taxes, prior to distribution, if
they are assigned to a creditor. The amount of the federal income tax liability depends upon many factors.282 In addition, the benefits payable may be
subject to federal income tax withholding by the trustee of the ERISA qualified plan, and thus only a net amount may be distributable.28 3 Who will be
liable for the federal income tax may depend also upon who collects the
benefits, i.e., the trustee of the bankruptcy estate or the creditor, and when
the taxable event occurs; i.e., at the time of the assignment of the plan interest or the collection of the benefits.28 4 The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980
provides authority to the effect that the transfer to the trustee in bankruptcy of the debtor's right to plan benefits would not be a taxable disposition
22

8 1.R.C. §§ 402 and 72 generally govern the taxability of distributions from plans. Certain lump sum
distributions may be eligible for 5-year or 10-year forward averaging under I.R.C. § 402(e) and, if the
debtor were a participant in the plan before 1974, may be eligible for long-term capital gains treatment
under I.R.C. § 402(a)(1). Generally, I.R.C. § 402(a) governs distributions from qualified, tax-exempt plans
and I.R.C. § 402(b) governs distributions from plans that were but no longer are qualified or tax-exempt.
Further the source of contributions, whether there was any life insurance coverage and how and why
benefits are payable, are factors. See also supra note 37 and accompanying text. See In re Kochell, 53 Bankr.
250 (Bankr. W.D. wis. 1985), regarding the inapplicability to the bankruptcy trustee of certain additional
taxes under I.R.C. § 72(m)(5) (1984) (prior to its amendment by the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-369) upon an early withdrawal from a pension plan. See also I.R.C. § 1398 with respect to certain federal income tax rules applicable to bankruptcy estates, and its potential interplay with the Internal Revenue Code sections discussed above in this note.
283
I.R.C. § 3405. There are times when an individual receiving plan payments may elect not to have
an amount withheld. Id. § 3405(a)(2)(b)(3), (d)(10).
284
E.g., I.R.C. §§ 1398, § 6901. Treas. Reg. § 301.6901-1(b) (1967) states that a transferee includes
the assignee of an insolvent person. See also 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1979), modified, BAFJA, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§§ 307, 454 (1984), regarding what taxes are not subject to discharge by bankruptcy.
Parkinson v. Bradford Trust Co. (In re O'Brien), 50 Bankr. 67, 80 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (LEXIS,
Bkrtcy library, Cases file) where the court stated:
The final question before the Court is the issue of the assessment of income taxes
and tax penalties for early withdrawal of the funds from the Keogh plan and whether
the debtor or the trustee will be required to bear the burden. The Court concludes
that the issue is not ripe at the present because no taxes or penalties have been
assessed by the Internal Revenue Service against either party.... Moreover, the
Internal Revenue Service is not a party to this proceeding. Finally the Court questions its jurisdiction to entertain a tax claim which may more properly belong in
another forum.
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of such rights; however, if this is true, then if the trustee assigns these rights
to a creditor, general federal income tax principles would treat the assignment as a taxable sale or exchange of the rights. 28 5 With respect to state income taxes, the applicable state law would determine if there is any tax liability
or withholding requirements.
Another problem involves the federal income tax consequences to the
ERISA qualified plan and all its participants, including the debtor, when the
debtor's interest in the plan is considered property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate, or when the bankruptcy trustee assigns it to a creditor. Internal
Revenue Code section 401(a)(13) provides that a trust cannot be exempt from
federal income taxes if the plan, of which the trust is a part, does not provide
that benefits may not be assigned or alienated. If a plan provides that benefits
are not alienable or assignable, but a bankruptcy or other court holds the
plan provision unenforceable or invalid, then the trust may not qualify as exempt from federal income taxes. The plan, in essence, may cease being a "qualified" plan notwithstanding that the plan is subject to ERISA. The Internal
Revenue Service has ruled privately that a plan will lose its exemption from
federal income taxation if the plan trustee complies with a bankruptcy court
order to pay a chapter 13 debtor's benefits to the bankruptcy trustee. 28 6 This
ruling has no precedential value to anyone other than the taxpayer who requested it;28 7 and one bankruptcy court chose to disregard its conclusion,
holding that "an order by a bankruptcy court directing a pension plan to pay
over a debtor's interest in an ERISA plan to a Chapter 7 trustee does not
disqualify a plan from receiving favorable tax treatment pursuant to Internal
Revenue Code Section 401(a)(13).'2 88 A separate issue not covered in this
article is whether a bankruptcy court has authority to make this determination.
If a trust, which is part of a retirement plan, is disqualified under Internal Revenue Code section 401(a), and thus is not exempt from federal income taxes, the disqualification would affect the following: (i) the employer,
with respect to its decision to continue or terminate the plan and with respect
to the deductibility of its contributions; (ii) the trust, with respect to the
2 51.R.C. § 1398(f). See also with respect to a sale or exchangetaxable event theory United States
v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). On the other hand, if the transaction were treated as an assignment of
income by the participant, and if the participant used the cash receipts and disbursements method of
accounting, then the participant generally would be taxed on each distribution when received by the creditor who was assigned the right.
28
Private Letter Ruling 8131020 (May 5, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedtax library, PRLTR file). The participant
was a chapter 13 debtor who was receiving monthly retirement benefits from a pension plan. The issue
upon which the Internal Revenue Service ruled was whether complying with a bankruptcy court order
to pay a chapter 13 debtor's monthly retirement benefits to the bankruptcy trustee would violate I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(13) and thus disqualify the plan.
28 7I.R.C. § 61100)(3).
288
Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di Piazza), 29 Bankr. 916, 923 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1983),
discussed supra text accompanying notes 144, 151.
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taxability of the income earned by the trust; and (iii) all participants, not
just the debtor, with respect to when contributions and benefits would be
taxable to each participant. 2 9 Because of the significant ramifications of a
decision involving whether one debtor's interest in a plan is assignable, the
trustee of the ERISA "qualified" plan will be in a precarious position if the
plan trustee turns over the plan benefits to a bankruptcy trustee. If a plan
trustee willingly turns over plan benefits, a participant in the plan might sue
the plan trustee for a failure to act prudently, for a failure to act in the in,
terest of the participants and beneficiaries, or for a failure to discharge the
trustee's duties in accordance with the plan document, which includes breach
of the plan provision prohibiting assignment. 290 f a participant or beneficiary
prevailed, then the trustee of the ERISA plan could become liable for "any
losses to the plan resulting from each such breach" and for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs 29' and could become subject to removal and such other
equitable or remedial relief as the court deems appropriate. 292 However, the
trustee of the ERISA qualified plan also may be subjected to contempt charges
if the trustee fails to comply with a bankruptcy court order to turn over a
debtor's plan interest; although the plan trustee may be able to appeal the
order and have it reversed. 293 A further issue not discussed in this article
2891f the trust were exempt from federal income taxes and then lost its tax-exempt status, income earned
and contributions made after the loss in status are affected. I.R.C. §§ 402(b), 83. In addition, benefits
that are made available to participants are taxable even though not distributed; whereas, if the plan were
qualified and the trust exempt from federal income taxes this would not be the case. I.R.C. § 402(a) refers
to the "amount actually distributed" whereas, I.R.C. § 402(b) refers to the "amount actually distributed
or made available" (emphasis added).
290ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) authorizes participants to bring civil actions.
ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 requires a fiduciary, including a trustee, to "discharge his duties with
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants ... for the exclusive purpose of ...defraying
reasonable expenses of administering the plan" and "with care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man ...would use . .' and "in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with
the provisions of this title" (which includes the prohibition against assignment and alienation of plan benefits
required by ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1)). See Bishops v. Masters (In re Masters), No.
386-01365-P7 (Bankr. D. Ore. May 6, 1987) (LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file) (where the court orderedthe trustee to turn over plan assets even though compliance might disqualify the plan). See also In re
Pettit, 61 Bankr. 341, 348-49 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1986) (where the court assured the employer: "Noth
ing in this decision should affect the qualification of the plans under ERISA and I.R.C. This order does
not require the employer to disburse to the trustee any portion of the plans which were not vested and
fully available to the debtor had she chosen to withdraw her share immediately prior to the bankruptcy
filing").
29
-ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
The criminal sanctions of ERISA would not be applicable because they only apply to willful violations of Part 1 of Subtitle B of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-31 (the reporting and disclosure provisions).

ERISA § 501, U.S.C. § 1131.
22

9 ERISA § 502 (g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) grants the court discretion to allow a reasonable attorney's
fee and
costs of action to either party.
293The plan trustee may be able to appeal the turnover order or a contempt order. The plan trustee
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is whether the plan trustee has standing in the bankruptcy court to raise
294
any of these issues.
Accordingly, if a debtor's interest in an ERISA "qualified" plan is included as property of the estate and is not exempt, there are potential problems
for the bankruptcy trustee and the ERISA plan trustee, including the plan's
qualified status, the loss of which would affect not only the debtor, the
bankruptcy trustee, and the creditors, but also the plan sponsor, the plan
trust, and the plan participant.
IV. CONCLUSION
The main substantive issue is whether a chapter 7 debtor's interest as
a participant in an ERISA qualified plan is property of the chapter 7 debtor's
estate. The answer depends upon whether the debtor's interest in the trust,
which is part of the ERISA qualified plan, is subject to a restriction on transfer that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law. Since the labor
and Internal Revenue Code provisions of ERISA require a plan to provide
that benefits may not be assigned or alienated, then the plan interest generally is considered to be subject to an enforceable restriction on transfer under nonbankruptcy law. Certain courts have held that the law, upholding these
ERISA required plan provisions in nonbankruptcy proceedings, qualifies as
applicable nonbankruptcy law, and thus, ERISA qualified plan interests are
not property of a chapter 7 debtor's estate.
Other courts have not considered ERISA or the ERISA required plan
provision to be applicable nonbankruptcy law. Some courts that follow this
line of thinking, however, have excluded an ERISA qualified plan interest
if the interest is subject to a spendthrift provision that is valid under state
law. Whereas, other courts have found that an ERISA qualified plan interest
was not the type of trust interest that could be excluded from being property
of the estate, thus implying that the trust interest would be property whether
or not the trust interest were subject to an enforceable restriction on transfer.
Thus, with respect to ERISA qualified plan interests, there is no uniform
application of the meaning of the property definition exception in Bankruptalso may need to request a stay of the order pending the appeal. But see McLean v. Central States, S.E.
& S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985) (the court stated that good faith alone would
not insulate a plan trustee from civil contempt for failure to comply with a bankruptcy court's pay order,
without a stay of such order, but held even though there had been no stay of the order that the contempt
charge was dismissed because the plan trustee had succeeded on appeal in having the pay order reversed).
For an example of other potential liability, see Parkinson v. Bradford Trust Co. (In re O'Brien), 50
Bankr. 67 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985), where the bankruptcy trustee requested, but was denied, punitive
damages against a self-employed debtor for failure to turn over assets. In that case, the debtor was not
the plan trustee nor were damages requested against the corporate trustee of the plan. The court did,
however, order the assets to be turned over to the bankruptcy trustee.
294
E.g., BAFJA, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 104(a) (1984) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)) refers
to timely filed objections of "any party."
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cy Code section 541(c)(2) for trust interests subject to enforceable restrictions against transfer. There are conflicts between opinions of various bankruptcy, district, and circuit courts. Further there are conflicts among the circuit
court of appeals raised by various interpretations of the application of state
29 s
law and raised by dictum.
With respect to the chapter 7 property issue involving ERISA qualified
plans, a review of the circuit court decisions and some applicable lower court
decisions (reported as of June, 1987) reveals the following.
The Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have indicated that ERISA
is not applicable nonbankruptcy law within the meaning of the property exclusion of Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2). 296 It also would appear that
the Second and Fourth Circuits would agree based upon their decisions applying Bankruptcy Code section 541(c) in a chapter 13 context. 297 Instead,
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits construed applicable nonbankruptcy law to
refer only to state spendthrift trust law; thus, looking to state law to determine whether the trust, which was part of an ERISA qualified plan, was
a valid spendthrift trust under state law.298 The Eighth Circuit construed
the exclusion relating to applicable nonbankruptcy law to refer to "traditional spendthrift trusts as recognized by state law.2 99 The Ninth Circuit stated
that the exclusion was "intended to be a narrow reference to state 'spendthrift trust' law,' but then included the debtor's plan interest without discussing any state law.300 It was unclear, however, from the opinions of the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits whether any trust which is part of an ERISA qualified plan could fit within the exclusion in those jurisdictions. At least two
bankruptcy courts in the Eighth Circuit have concluded that all such plan
interests are included as property of the estate, while at least two bankruptcy courts in the Ninth Circuit have concluded that such plan interests are
excluded if they are subject to restrictions against transfer which are enforceable
under state law. 30 1 The Seventh Circuit, in a footnote, rejected a debtor's
295

Compare, e.g., Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1982) (chapter 13); Clark v. O'Neill (In re Clark),
711 F.2d 21, 23-24 (3d Cir. 1983) (Becker, J., concurring dictum) (chapter 7); McLean v. Central States
S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1984) (chapter 13); Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff),
706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983) (chapter 7); In re Kochell, 732 F.2d 564, 566 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984) (chapter
7); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984) (chapter 7); Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985) (chapter 7); Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In
re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488 (lth Cir. 1985) (chapter 7).
2
96Goff, Graham, Daniel, Lichstrahl, supra note 295.
297
Regan and McLean, supra note 295.
29
8Goff, supra note 295, at 497; Lichstrahl, supra note 295, at 1490.
299
Graham, supra note 295, at 1271, 1272.
30ODaniel, supra note 295, at 1360.
30
Eighth Circuit: In re Flygstad, 56 Bankr. 884 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986); Samore v. Independent
Services, Inc. (In re McKenna), 58 Bankr. 221 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986); In re Bartlett, 67 Bankr. 455
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986).
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argument that his interest in a contributory pension plan was not property
of the estate, but the theory or effect of the holding on other debtors in the
Seventh Circuit is unclear.30 2 On the basis of dictum in a concurring opinion,
the Third Circuit indicated that a debtor's interest in a plan sponsored by
the debtor's employer, where the debtor was not selfemployed, would not
be property of the debtor's estate.303 Further, at least one district court and
one bankruptcy court in the Tenth Circuit 30 4 and bankruptcy courts in the
Third, Sixth, 3°0 and Tenth Circuits have found that ERISA qualifies as applicable nonbankruptcy law within the meaning of the property definition
exclusion. 3o6 Also, a bankruptcy court in the First Circuit has considered a
hybrid theory involving ERISA and state law, whereby an ERISA qualified
plan could be excluded if it were analogous to a spendthrift trust under state
law.3 07 However, some bankruptcy courts in the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuits have looked only to state law as to the applicable nonbankruptcy
law for the exclusion.308 In addition, the Second Circuit has held that the
Ninth Circuit: In re Shuman, 68 Bankr. 290 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1986); Bishop v. Cates (In re Cates),
No. 386-03070-P7 (Bankr. D. Ore. May 20, 1987) (LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file); In re West, 64
Bankr. 738 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1986), discussed supra note 125; In re Pruitt, 61 Bankr. 341 (Bankr. WD.
Wash. 1986); In re White, 61 Bankr. 388 (Bankr. WD. Wash. 1986), revising decision of Nelson v. White
(In re White), 47 Bankr. 410, discussed supra notes 130, 150.
302Kochell, supra note 295, at 566 n.3.
303Clark, supra note 295, at 23-24.
304District Court in 10th Circuit: Clotfelter v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. (In re Threewitt), 24 Bankr. 927
(D. Kan. 1982), rev'g 20 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982), discussed supra at text and accompanying
notes 109-12; In re Creamer, No. 86-2476-5 (Bankr. D. Kan. May 7, 1987) (LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases
file); In re Ralstin, 61 Bankr. 502 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986).
5
'TheSixth Circuit has not ruled in the area except to vacate a bankruptcy court opinion that had
held that the Bankruptcy Code impliedly amended a portion of ERISA with respect to the enforcement
of bankruptcy court orders under chapter 13. In re Wood, No. 82-5661 (6th Cir. May 18, 1984) (LEXIS,
Bkrtcy library, Cases file) (not recommended for full-text publication) vacating as moot In re Wood, 23
Bankr. 552 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
306Bankruptcy Court in Third Circuit: Liscinski v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 42 Bankr. 181 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1984), discussed supra note 113.
Bankruptcy Court in Sixth Circuit: Warren v. G. M. Scott & Sons (In re Phillips), 34 Bankr. 543
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983), discussed supra note 113.
307Bezanson v. Maine Nat Bank (In re Kwaak), 42 Bankr. 599 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984), discussed supra
at text accompanying note 123.
30SBankruptcy Court in Fourth Circuit: Gray v. Ingles Markets, Inc. Employees' Stock Bonus Plan
(In re De Weese), 47 Bankr. 251 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985), discussed supra notes 125, 240; Parkinson
v. Bradford Trust Co. (In re O'Brien), 50 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985), discussed supra notes 125, 146.
Bankruptcy Courts in Sixth Circuit: In re Slezak, 63 Bankr. 625 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986), discussed
supra note 126; In re La Fata, 41 Bankr. 842 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984), and Simon v. Braden (In re Braden),
No. 85-0634-R (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987), both discussed supra note 125; In re Wiggins, 60 Bankr. 89
(N.D. Ohio 1986), discussed supra note 125; In re Hotchkiss, Bankr. No. 84-00108 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
June 17, 1987) (LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file); In re Elsea, 47 Bankr. 142 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985),
discussed supra at text and accompanying notes 134-35; In re Ridenour,45 Bankr. 72 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1984), discussed supra at note 146; In re Clark, 18 Bankr. 824 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982), discussed supra
text and accompanying note 146. See also Avery Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. (In re Klayer), 20 Bankr. 270
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981), discussed supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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property exclusion under Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2) would not prevent a retired debtor's right to plan benefits from being used, with his consent, to pay creditors under a chapter 13 plan.30 9 And one bankruptcy court
in the Second Circuit interpreted the Second Circuit's opinion to "restrict
the applicability of the section [541(c)(2)] to spendthrift trusts in particular,'
thus holding that a debtor's interest in a retirement plan was property of the
decedent's estate.31 0 By contrast, the Fourth Circuit when considering the
chapter 13 definition of property, which incorporates the chapter 7 definition of property, followed the Fifth Circuit to hold that the chapter 7 definition and exclusion refers to state law as applicable nonbankruptcy law.3" Thus,
there is no uniform, consistent interpretation of the meaning of "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" with respect to the exclusion to the Bankruptcy Code
property definition as to whether ERISA or state law, or neither, qualifies
as applicable nonbankruptcy law to exclude a debtor's interest in an ERISA
qualified plan. Thus, there is no consensus as to whether a debtor's interest
in an ERISA qualified plan can or will be excluded from a chapter 7 debtor's
estate. Further, in jurisdictions where state law is applicable nonbankruptcy
law, there is an underlying issue as to whether ERISA preempts any state
law that would prevent the enforcement of the ERISA required prohibition
on assignment or alienation.
The next question is whether the debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified plan should be excluded from being property of a chapter 7 debtor's estate. One of the purposes of the ERISA requirements that plan benefits not
be assignable or alienable is to ensure that a participant's benefits be available to him or her for retirement purposes. The ERISA required plan provisions in nonbankruptcy matters have been upheld to prevent voluntary
assignments and alienations by a participant and involuntary adjustments and
alienations effectuated by a participant's creditor. Thus, it would be consistent with ERISA to preclude a debtor's interest in a plan from being property
Bankruptcy Courts in Seventh Circuit: Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di Piazza), 29
Bankr. 916 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983), discussed supra text accompanying notes 144, 151; In re McVade,
No. 86-61195 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Apr. 27, 1987) (LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Cases file); Miller v. Lincoln
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Cook), 43 Bankr. 996 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1984), discussed supra text accompanying note 133; Miller v. Jones (In re Jones), 43 Bankr. 1003 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1984), discussed supra
text and accompanying notes 131-32; In re Berndt, 34 Bankr. 515 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983), discussed
supra text and accompanying notes 114-15. See also supra text and accompanying notes 93-94.
Bankruptcy Courts in Tenth Circuit: In re Matteson, 58 Bankr. 909 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986), discussed
supra notes 113 and 125; McClean v. McClean (In re Kerr); 65 Bankr. 739 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986), discussed supra note 125.
309Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1982) (chapter 13).
31°In
re Woodford, No. 85-01050, slip op. at 11 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1987) (LEXIS, Bkrtcy library,
Cases file).
31 1
McLean v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985) (chapter 13).
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of the debtor's chapter 7 estate. Further, even if state law is the applicable
law, it would be consistent with ERISA to preclude a debtor's interest from
being property of the bankruptcy estate because ERISA preempts state law
from not enforcing the ERISA required prohibition against assignment or alienation.
If, however, the debtor has the right as of the commencement of the
bankruptcy case to receive or withdraw any portion of the debtor's interest
in the plan, it would not be inconsistent with ERISA to include the debtor's
right to receive or withdraw any such portion in the chapter 7 debtor's estate. Thus, if a debtor has the right at any time to withdraw his or her employee contributions, without forfeiting any employer contributions or benefits,
thien the underlying purpose of ERISA would not be thwarted by including
the right to the debtor's employee contributions as property of the chapter
7 debtor's estate. Further, if a debtor has terminated employment or retired
on or before the day the bankruptcy case commenced and has the right to
receive his or her benefits in a lump sum as of the commencement of the case,
then ERISA would not be thwarted by including that right as property of
the debtor's estate. Whereas, if the debtor were in current pay status at the
time of the commencement of the bankruptcy case and prior to that time
irrevocably had elected to receive benefits in the form of an annuity or installments, the purpose of ERISA would be thwarted if future annuity or
installment payments payable after the case commenced were included in the
chapter 7 debtor's estate. By contrast, if the debtor has received payments
from the plan, the purposes of ERISA would not be thwarted if the payments
received by the debtor prior to the commencement of the case were included
in the chapter 7 debtor's estate.
The underlying purposes of the chapter 7 bankruptcy laws are to use
the debtor's property as of the commencement of the case to pay creditors
to the extent possible and to give the debtor a fresh start. Since the Bankruptcy
Code excludes a debtor's interest in a trust that is subject to a restriction
on transfer that is enforceable under state law, it would follow that excluding a debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified plan and trust that is subject
to the ERISA required prohibition against alienatiion would not be inconsistent with the purposes of the bankruptcy laws. Thus, in order to effectuate
the purpose of ERISA that plan benefits be available for retirement purposes
and the purposes of the chapter 7 bankruptcy laws, a debtor's interest in
an ERISA qualified plan should be excluded from being property of a chapter
7 debtor's estate except to the extent the debtor has a current right to withdraw or receive any portion of the debtor's interest in the plan. If ERISA
is to be construed in this manner, in conjunctioin with the Bankruptcy Code,
then the cases should reflect this interpretation of property under Bankruptcy Code section 541(c) consistently. If the courts do not do so, then ERISA
or the Bankruptcy Code should be amended specifically to clarify this. On
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the other hand, if the purpose of ERISA to ensure that a participant's benefits
be available for retirement is no longer valid with respect to a participant
who is a chapter 7 debtor, then ERISA, including the Internal Revenue Code,
should be amended specifically to reflect this.
The cases and the provisions and interpretations of ERISA and the
Bankruptcy Code should be uniform with respect to whether ERISA is the
authority to prevent a debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified plan from being property of his or her estate or whether the provisions of the applicable
state law will be the determining authority or whether such plan interest
will be included as property of the estate under the authority of the Bankruptcy
Code regardless of ERISA or state law. Then the Bankruptcy Code will be
construed uniformly as to what law is applicable. Then, as now, the exemption issue only would be relevant to the extent an ERISA qualified plan interest is included in the chapter 7 debtor's estate. Further, if a debtor's interest
in an ERISA qualified plan is included in the debtor's estate, then there should
be a uniform application as to whether ERISA provides an exemption under
other federal law. Through June, 1987, the courts that have ruled on this
32
issue have held that ERISA does not provide another federal law exemption, 1
33
with one exception being the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas. 1
The resolution of the property issue under chapter 7 involves more than
just balancing the rights of the debtor and his or her creditors. The issue
also involves many innocent, nondebtor participants in the plan and the plan
sponsor who will be affected if the ERISA required plan provisions are not
upheld. Thus, the resolution of the issues involves not only the immediate
parties to the bankruptcy case but also the Internal Revenue Service, the
ERISA plan sponsor, the ERISA plan trustees, and the other ERISA plan
participants who are not parties to the bankruptcy case. These nonparties
would be affected by the disqualification of the ERISA plan under the Internal Revenue Code and the trust's loss of exempt status from federal income
taxes and the potential breach of the labor provisions of ERISA. Thus, the
effect of a court decision involving a bankruptcy may have an impact much
greater than just whether the debtor or the debtor's creditors ultimately receive
the debtor's plan benefits. Judicial or legislative clarification is required now
so that the Internal Revenue Code, ERISA, and the Bankruptcy Code can
be interpreted consistently in bankruptcy, federal income tax, and other nonbankruptcy proceedings, and the issue of implied repeal can be resolved.
2

31

See supra Section IlI.B.3 of this article, entitled "Federal Nonbankruptcy Exemption (Bankruptcy

Code Section 522(b)(2)(A));' and cases cited and discussed therein.
33In re Hinshaw, 23 Bankr. 233 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982).

